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ABSTRACT
This dissertation provides two papers on asset market bubbles. The first chapter
analyzes the welfare effect of anti-bubble policy in a macroeconomic model containing both
an asset market and a goods market. Overall, this chapter shows that anti-bubble policy
decreases the welfare of asset seller, increases the welfare of asset buyers, and has no effect
on the welfare of the production side of the goods market. The second chapter provides
examples of strong greater-fool bubbles with three states of the world and three periods. It
provides examples of strong greater-fool bubbles at various levels of endowment durability,
as well as an example with a one-period bond issued in period 2.
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CHAPTER 1
Flexible Asset Markets and Sluggish Goods Markets:
Lessons from a Simple Macroeconomic Model
1.1 Introduction
Should monetary authorities attempt to suppress asset price bubbles, or even burst
them outright? Around the time of the United States tech bubble, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001) examined this question in the context of a macroe-
conomic model with exogenous bubbles and warned that setting interest rates in response
to asset price movements, i.e., asset price targeting, would increase volatility in output and
inflation. Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Cecchetti et al. (2002) examine a similar model and
find that asset price targeting is a necessary component of monetary authorities’ optimal
interest rate rule. However, Roubini (2006) criticized these models for their use of exogenous
bubbles rather than endogenous bubbles.
Using models of endogenous bubbles like those in Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985),
Gali (1977) examines the suppression of these bubbles through interest rate hikes in an over-
lapping generations (OLG) macroeconomic model, with sticky goods prices. However, these
OLG bubbles require an infinite horizon because people must believe that these bubbles will
last forever, at least in expected value. In contrast, real-world bubbles seem to be character-
ized by more short-run, finite-horizon speculative activity. Thus, the overpricing in Samuel-
son (1958), Tirole (1985), and Gali (1977) may be more descriptive of inter-generational
saving rather than the sort of short-run, speculative fluctuation of concern to policymakers.
In greater-fool bubble models, like those of Allen et al. (1993), Conlon (2004),Conlon
(2015), Holt (2018), and Liu and Conlon (2018), agents trade a bubble-prone asset even
1
though they know that the bubble will only last a finite number of periods. These models
may therefore better capture the sorts of short-run fluctuations relevant to counter-cyclical
policy. Both Conlon (2015) and Holt (2018) examine the welfare implications of a monetary
authority which bursts these greater-fool bubbles by releasing information about their over-
pricing. However, unlike the welfare analysis in Gali (1977), Conlon (2015) and Holt (2018)
focus on welfare in asset markets themselves and do not examine spillover effects on welfare
in goods markets with sluggish goods prices.
We examine the welfare effects of anti-bubble policy in a finite-horizon, greater fool
bubble model that includes a goods market where prices are sticky, as in Gali (1977),. This
model captures the Keynesian notion of an economy with volatile asset markets and sluggish
goods markets. Unlike Gali (1977), our bubble has a greater-fool flavor and can exist in
a finite horizon environment, which makes it more like the speculative bubbles in Conlon
(2015) and Holt (2018), rather than the OLG bubbles in Tirole (1985) and Samuelson (1958).
Our bubble model should also capture the short-run nature of real world bubbles.
The long-term goal of our research is to examine the welfare effects of anti-bubble
policy in a macroeconomic model containing both an asset market, where a bubble may
exist, and a goods market, where prices of the goods are set through Fischer (1977)-style
long-term price contracts. Thus, the full model will have an asset market with flexible prices
and a goods market with sticky prices.
As a first step, we separate the asset market from the goods market and consider
the welfare implications of anti-bubble policy in the asset market itself. In order to more
easily incorporate a volatile asset market into the broader macroeconomic model, we examine
an asset market that experiences a “semi-bubble,” rather than a “strong bubble” like that
in Allen et al. (1993). We say that an asset experiences a semi-bubble if it is overpriced
even though some people know that it is overpriced (see Holt (2018) who calls this a “weak
bubble”). By contrast, an asset experiences a strong bubble if it is overpriced, and everyone
knows that it is overpriced (Allen et al. (1993)). Previous models, like Conlon (2015) and
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Holt (2018), have examined the welfare impact of deflating overpriced assets in models with
strong bubbles, where trading of the overpriced asset is motivated by gains to cross-state
consumption smoothing. The present analysis, however, examines the welfare effects on the
asset market of bursting a semi-bubble in a model where trading of the overpriced asset is
motivated by intertemporal consumption smoothing, as in Liu and White (2018), instead
of cross-state consumption smoothing. That is, trade in this paper is motivated by agents’
desire to stabilize their consumption paths over time by transferring consumption from high-
income periods to low-incomes periods.
As in Conlon (2015) and Holt (2018), the anti-bubble policy of the current paper
takes the form of “pricking” bubbles by revealing information rather than “leaning against
the wind” by using interest rate policy to suppress bubbles. There are two states of the
world in our model, and the asset is overpriced in one of these states. The seller always
knows whether or not the asset is overpriced. We also assume that whatever is known to
the seller is also known to the central bank. Under an anti-bubble policy, if the asset is
overpriced, then the central bank announces this information to the asset market.1 If the
asset is not overpriced, then the lack of an announcement from the central bank is an implicit
endorsement of the asset’s value. Note that our model of policy is simpler than a model where
a central bank suppresses a bubble by raising interest rates – that is, by selling assets which
compete with the return on the overpriced asset.2
Overall, I find that deflating the overpriced asset tends to hurt risk-averse asset sellers
1Note that the introduction of derivatives may also transmit information about whether the derivative’s
underlying asset is overpriced. For example, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) noticed that the fall in US homes
prices in 2006 immediately followed the introduction of publicly traded CDS contracts. More recently, Hale
et al. (2018) noticed that the crash in the price of Bitcoin coincided with the introduction of Bitcoin futures
on the CME exchange. Thus, the information-revelation policy in this paper could be re-interpreted simply
as a policy which encourages the development of markets which better transmit information from informed
investors to others.
2Future research should examine this more realistic type of anti-bubble policy in finite-horizon models
like ours. Gali (1977) finds that increasing interest rates in his OLG model in response to a bubble tends
to exacerbate the bubble’s growth, which leads him to question the welfare benefits of anti-bubble policy.
More recently, Allen et al. (2018) examine interest rate policy in a risk-shifting model of loans with default
costs. They find that ex ante welfare is improved when a central bank commits to raising interest rates in
response to a developing bubble, even when the social costs of default are small.
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in the market as long as their underlying endowment of the consumption good is constant,
rather than correlated with the future return on the asset. On the other hand, in contrast to
the results of Holt (2018), where trade is motivated by risk-sharing rather than intertemporal
consumption smoothing, the current model finds that a policy of deflating overpriced assets
helps asset buyers.3 Specifically, risk-averse asset buyers are always helped, ex ante, by
anti-bubble policy when they have decreasing absolute risk aversion (or DARA) preferences.
Ongoing work is examining the welfare implications for goods markets when anti-
bubble policy enables information possessed by better-informed asset sellers to be transmit-
ted to goods-price setters who must set prices in advance.
The next section presents the model of an asset market containing a semi-bubble.
Section 3 examines the welfare impact of anti-bubble policy on risk-averse asset-sellers. Sec-
tion 4 examines the welfare impacts of anti-bubble policy on risk-averse asset buyers. Section
5 discusses future work on models which include goods markets with prices set in advance.
1.2 A Weak Bubble with Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing
The model presented builds on assumptions similar to those from previous greater-
fool bubble papers, namely Allen et al. (1993), Conlon (2004), Conlon (2015), Holt (2018),
Zheng (2013), Liu and Conlon (2018), and more recently,Liu and White (2018). The asset
market is Walrasian, and it lasts for two periods. There are two agents: the asset buyer and
the asset seller. For ease of exposition, the seller will be given the female pronoun “she”,
and the buyer will be given the male pronoun “he”. As in Liu and White (2018), agents
consume a perishable consumption good in every period, which this paper will call “apples.”
There is no money in our model, but agents can trade shares of the asset X, which we call
apple trees, in exchange for apples. Apple trees are the only asset in the model, and they
are risky. An apple tree could pay one bushel of apples in the future per tree owned (i.e.,
3This result also contrasts with the three-period example inLiu and White (2018) where the ultimate
greater-fool asset buyer can be hurt by anti-bubble policy, since it interferes with his intertemporal con-
sumption smoothing.
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per share), or it could pay nothing.
At the beginning of period 1, the seller possesses more information about the risky
asset’s value than the buyer does. She also possesses all of the available shares of the asset,
S, while the buyer initially possesses no shares. There are two states of the world, called L
and H. Thus, the state space is Ω = {L,H}, and the prior probabilities for each state are
piL and piH , respectively.
In state L, the asset pays nothing in period 2; in other words, its period-2 dividend
is zero. In state H, the asset pays a period-2 dividend of 1 unit of the consumption good (a
bushel of apples) for each share of the asset owned.4 Figure 1 shows the period-1 information
structure of both agents. In period 1, the seller knows the true state with certainty, so she
L H
Figure 1.1: Period-1 Information Structure
can distinguish L from H. On the other hand, the buyer is unable to distinguish L from H
in period 1.
Note that, the existence of asymmetric information is not pivotal for our results.
Our results would still hold even if the asset seller does not know the true state of the
world, and so, had the same information set as the asset buyer. Instead, our results are
driven by uncertainty about the true state of the world as it pertains to the risky asset’s
return. However, since the central bank must know the true state of the world in order to
implement anti-bubble policy, it makes some sense that some segments of the asset market
are more informed than others (namely, sellers). Otherwise, we would be making the lofty
assumption that the central bank knows more about the asset market than every asset-
market participant.
4Note, the asset does not pay a dividend in period 1 in either state of the world.
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For ease of notation, assume buyers and sellers have the same utility function over
consumption of apples, u(c), though nothing below depends on this. Thus, the lifetime
utility for the buyer is UB = u(cB1 ) + βu(c
B
2 ), and the lifetime utility for the seller is U
S =
u(cS1 ) + βu(c
S
2 ). In addition to apples from the traded apple trees, agents receive perishable
endowments of apples in each period from trees which cannot be traded. In period 1, the
buyer receives an endowment of eB1 (L) = e
B
1 (H) = e
B
1 bushels of apples. The seller receives a
period-1 endowment of eS1 (L) = e
S
1 (H) = e
S
1 bushels of apples. Furthermore, the buyer and
the seller receive period-2 endowments of eB2 (L) = e
B
2 (H) = e
B
2 and e
S
2 (L) = e
S
2 (H) = e
S
2 ,
respectively. Notice that agents’ endowments in period t are the same in both states of the
world L and H.5
In the equilibria that are considered below, we assume eS1 is sufficiently small relative
to eS2 that the seller turns out to sell all the shares in her possession, S, in both states L
and H of period 1. Thus, the seller sells the asset in state L of period 1 because she knows
it is worthless (the dividend is zero in period 2), and she sells the asset in state H of period
1 to augment her small period-1 endowment of the consumption good, and so, smooth her
consumption intertemporally over periods 1 and 2. Therefore, the asset seller could be said
to have a large “liquidity demand” in period 1, state H (see Liu and White (2018)). The
buyer, on the other hand, cannot distinguish state L from state H at the beginning of period
1. Also, because the seller will sell S shares in both states of the world, the buyer will remain
unable to distinguish L from H in period 1, even after observing the seller’s behavior. Thus,
a lemons problem is present in period 1, but trade will nevertheless occur if we also assume
that eB2 is so small relative to e
B
1 that the buyer is willing to risk purchasing a worthless
asset in hopes of adding to his small period-2 endowment of the consumption good, and so,
making his state H consumption, at least, intertemporally smoother.
5This assumption must be true for the buyer in period 1 in order for a semi-bubble to exist. Otherwise,
he could distinguish L from H in period 1, and he would have no reason to purchase the asset in state
L. However, period 1 endowments could differ for the seller while still allowing a semi-bubble in period 1.
However, in order to focus on the role of intertemporal consumption smoothing in the analysis, the equal-
endowments assumption will be maintained for both agents in both periods throughout the paper, though
see footnote 7 below.
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Finally, note the very extreme assumptions that we make to simplify the model.
There is only one asset, and so no money, the consumption is entirely perishable, and there
is no short-selling of the risky asset. Also, we choose parameters below so that sellers are
always at their short-sale constraint in period 1, even when they know the asset is valuable.
Thus, trading is very simple, and its only effect on period 2 welfare is in determining who
gets the potential period-2 dividend. Future research should therefore incorporate money as
well as other assets into the model. Note, however, that this will dramatically complicate
the effect of period 1 policy on period 2 wealth and consumption.
1.2.1 The Buyer’s Decision
1.2.1.1 The Buyer in the Absence of an Anti-Bubble Policy
In order for a weak bubble to exist in state L, period 1, the buyer must be willing
to purchase the asset even though he knows it may be worthless. It is therefore assumed
that eB1 is sufficiently large relative to e
B
2 so that the buyer has a strong motive to smooth
his state-H consumption over periods 1 and 2 by giving up some consumption in period 1,
to buy the asset, in order to consume the dividend in period 2. What’s more, we make the
buyer’s gains from smoothing his state-H consumption over periods 1 and 2 so large that he
is willing to purchase the asset even though the true state might be L.
In period 1, the buyer receives an endowment eB1 , and he purchases X shares from the
seller at a per-share price of P . In the absence of an anti-bubble policy, the buyer’s period-1
consumption is the same across states L and H, so cB1 (L) = c
B
1 (H) = c
B
1 = e
B
1 − PX. In
period 2, the buyer consumes eB1 plus any dividends that he receives from the asset. Thus,
his period-2 consumption in state L is simply cB2 (L) = e
B
2 , and his period-2 consumption in
state H is cB2 (H) = e
B
2 +X, since the dividend is 1 unit of consumption for each share that
is owned
7
The buyer chooses X so as to maximize his expected lifetime utility, given in (1.1).
E(UB) = u(eB1 − PX) + piLβu(eB2 ) + piHβu(eB2 +X). (1.1)
The buyer’s first order condition (FOC) with respect to X determines his demand for the
asset, and it therefore also helps to determine the buyer’s equilibrium willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for a share of the asset. We choose parameters such that, in equilibrium, the asset
buyer purchases all of the available shares of the risky asset, so X = S. As a result, the
buyer’s WTP determines the equilibrium asset price, so P = WTPB, where WTPB is the
solution to the the buyer’s equilibrium FOC as shown in (1.2) below and B stands for
“bubble.” Since the buyer’s FOC with respect to X is
u′(eB1 − PX)P = piHβu′(eB2 +X),
the equilibrium asset price in the absence of anti-bubble policy, or PNP , is determined by
u′(eB1 − PNPS)PNP = piHβu′(eB2 + S) (1.2)
where the subscript “NP”stands for “No Policy”.
Under a bubble equilibrium, the buyer’s ex-post welfare in state L is
u(eB1 − PNPS) + βu(eB2 ), (1.3)
while his ex-post welfare in state H is
u(eB1 − PNPS) + βu(eB2 + S). (1.4)
The asset buyer’s welfare is clearly higher in state H than it is in state L, since the asset
pays a dividend in period 2 of state H. Ex ante, the asset buyer’s expected welfare, given
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that he buys all S shares, is
EWBNP = u(e
B
1 − PNPS) + piLβu(eB2 ) + piHβu(eB2 + S). (1.5)
1.2.1.2 The Buyer in the Presence of an Anti-Bubble Policy
Under an anti-bubble policy, the central bank reveals whether the asset’s dividend is
zero, resulting in a “no-bubble equilibrium.” As such, the policy enables the asset buyer to
distinguish L from H. In state L, the buyer has no reason to purchase the asset since it pays
no dividend, so his state L welfare under the policy is
u(eB1 ) + βu(e
B
2 ). (1.6)
This is larger than his state-L welfare in the absence of a policy, since under the policy, the
buyer does not waste resources in state L, purchasing an asset that will not pay a dividend
in the future.
In state H under the policy, the buyer knows for sure that the asset will pay a
dividend, so he continues to purchase all of the seller’s shares. This means that the asset
buyer’s first order condition under the anti-bubble policy, after substituting in X = S, is
u′(eB1 − PPS)PP = βu′(eB2 + S), (1.7)
where the subscript “P ”stands for “Policy”. Intuitively, the buyer’s WTP in state H in the
presence of anti-bubble policy, which is determined by (1.7), should be larger than WTPB
since anti-bubble policy enables the buyer to know with certainty that the asset will pay a
dividend. That is, we should have PP > PNP , which is, in fact, what we find (see Lemma I
below). The buyer’s welfare in state H of the policy is then
u(eB1 − PPS) + βu(eB2 + S), (1.8)
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which is less than his state-H welfare in the absence of a policy, as shown in (1.4), since PP
is larger than PNP . The buyer’s overall ex ante welfare under the policy is
EWBP = piH
(
u(eB1 − PPS) + βu(eB2 + S)
)
+ piL
(
u(eB1 ) + βu(e
B
2 )
)
. (1.9)
In summary, the buyer will be hurt in state H by the anti-bubble policy, but helped in
state L. Thus, it is not immediately clear whether the policy improves or harms the buyer’s
overall ex ante welfare.
1.2.1.3 Asset Price Comparisons Across Equilibria
As discussed in the previous subsection, it is intuitively clear that the state-H asset
price under the policy, or PP , should be larger than the asset price in the absence of policy,
or PNP . Anti-bubble policy eliminates any risk surrounding the asset’s dividend. So if the
true state is H, the buyer’s WTP for the asset is larger under the policy than without the
policy. The assumption of Walrasian markets ensures that the equilibrium asset price equals
the buyer’s WTP which leads to Lemma I.
Lemma I: PP > PNP .
Proof. First, subtract the FOC in (2) from the FOC in (7)
u′(eB1 − PPS)PP − u′(eB1 − PNPS)PNP = piLβu′(eB2 + S) > 0. (1.10)
This must be positive since the marginal utility of consumption is positive.
Since the buyer is assumed to be risk-averse, u′(c) is decreasing in c, which means that
u′(eB1 − PS)P is increasing in P . This, in conjunction with (1.10), implies PP > PNP .
If the FOC (1.7) is used to substitute for βu′(eB2 + S) in the FOC (1.2), then a
relationship between the policy and no-policy asset prices can be determined, as
u′(eB1 − PNPS)PNP = piHu′(eB1 − PPS)PP . (1.11)
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Lemma II: piHPP < PNP .
Proof. First, PP > PNP , by Lemma 1, which implies e
B
1 −PPS < eB1 −PNPS. Risk aversion,
or u′(c) decreasing in c, then implies u′(eB1 − PPS) > u′(eB1 − PNPS). Finally, rewrite (1.11)
as
piHPP
PNP
=
u′(eB1 − PNPS)
u′(eB1 − PPS)
< 1,
which implies Lemma II.
Intuitively, piHPP is the ex ante expected price that the buyer pays for the asset in
a no-bubble equilibrium. Likewise, PNP is the price of the asset in a bubble equilibrium.
Thus, Lemma II says that the ex ante expected asset price under the policy, before the one
knows whether the state is L or H, is less than the asset price in the absence of policy. This
is because the buyer is poorer in period 1, state H of the no-bubble equilibrium relative to
the bubble equilibrium, which reduces the price he is willing to pay, PP , to the point that
piHPP < PNP .
1.2.2 The Seller’s Decision
To ensure that the asset seller sells all her shares in both states of the world in the
bubble equilibrium, it is assumed that eS2 is very large relative to e
S
1 . Thus, she sells the asset
in state L in period 1 because she knows it is worthless, but she sells it in state H in period
1 as a means of transferring consumption from period 2 to period 1, in order to supplement
her smaller period-1 endowment of the consumption good. That is, as explained above, the
asset seller has a large liquidity demand in period 1, state H.
In the absence of a policy, the seller’s period-1 consumption in both states L and H
of the bubble equilibrium equal cS1 = e
S
1 + PNPS. Since she sells all of her shares in period
1, the asset seller’s period-2 consumption is simply cS2 = e
S
2 for both L and H in the absence
of a policy. She will always sell all her shares in state L since she knows the dividend will
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be zero. Furthermore, she will always sell all of her shares in state H as long as
u′(eS1 + PNPS)PNP ≥ βu′(eS2 ), (1.12)
that is, if the period-1 marginal utility of selling an additional share is greater than or equal
to the period-2 marginal utility of consuming the dividend when the seller sells her entire
stock, S, of shares. Thus, while the buyer determines the equilibrium asset price, the seller
determines the volume of shares traded (i.e., S). The seller’s ex ante expected welfare in the
absence of policy is
EW SNP = u(e
S
1 + PNPS) + βu(e
S
2 ). (1.13)
In state L under the policy, the buyer knows the asset is worthless, so he does not
purchase any shares from the seller. This means that the seller’s state-L consumption in
period 1 is cS1 (L) = e
S
1 . Since the asset pays no dividend, the seller’s period-2 consumption
in state-L remains cS2 (L) = e
S
2 . The seller’s state-L welfare under the policy is therefore
u(eS1 ) + βu(e
S
2 ), (1.14)
which is less than her state-L welfare in the absence of an anti-bubble policy.
In state H under the policy, the seller continues to sell all of her shares, S, in period
1 as long as
u′(eS1 + PPS)PP ≥ βu′(eS2 ). (1.15)
Note that the condition in (1.12) does not necessarily imply the condition in (1.15), or visa-
versa. However, we assume parameters so that short-sale constraints in (1.12) and (1.15) are
jointly true.
Under the policy, the seller’s period-2 consumption in stateH continues to be cS2 (H) =
eS2 . However, her period-1 consumption in state H, c
S
1 (H) = e
S
1 + PPS, is larger than her
period-1 consumption in state H without the policy since PP > PNP . Thus, the seller’s
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state-H welfare under the policy,
u(eS1 + PPS) + βu(e
S
2 ), (1.16)
is greater than her state-H welfare in the bubble equilibrium, since PP > PNP .
In summary, the asset seller’s welfare is hurt by an anti-bubble policy in state L, but
her welfare is improved by an anti-bubble policy in state H, since she gets a higher price.
The seller’s overall ex ante expected welfare under the policy is
EW SP = piH
(
u(eS1 + PPS) + βu(e
S
2 )
)
+ piL
(
u(eS1 ) + βu(e
S
2 )
)
. (1.17)
As with the buyer, it is not immediately clear whether the policy improves or harms the
asset seller’s ex ante welfare. We consider this issue next.
1.3 Anti-Bubble Policy and the Asset Seller’s Ex Ante Welfare
To understand how anti-bubble policy affects the seller’s ex ante welfare, it’s necessary
to compare EW SP from (1.17) with EW
S
NP from (1.13). Define ∆EW
S as the difference in
welfare across the two different policies. Subtracting (1.13) from (1.17) and simplifying gives
∆EW S = EW SP − EW SNP
= piH
[
u(eS1 + PPS)− u(eS1 + PNPS)
]
+ piL
[
u(eS1 )− u(eS1 + PNPS)
] (1.18)
which can be rewritten as the difference of two weighted integrals, or
E∆W S = piH
eS1 +PPS∫
eS1 +PNPS
u′(c)dc− piL
eS1 +PNPS∫
eS1
u′(c)dc.
If ∆EW S > 0, then anti-bubble policy improves the seller’s ex ante welfare, and if
∆EW S < 0, then anti-bubble hurts the seller’s ex ante welfare.
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A few point are in order in regards to (1.18). First, ∆EW S is entirely dependent on
the seller’s period-1 consumption. Her utilities from period-2 consumption cancel out. This
means that anti-bubble policy has no effect on the seller’s period-2 welfare. This is intuitive
since her period-2 consumption behavior is the same in both equilibria. Second, as previously
discussed, anti-bubble policy helps the seller in state H by raising the asset price, so the
first term on the right hand side of (1.18), piH
[
u(eS1 + PPS)− u(eS1 + PNPS)
]
, is positive.
However, anti-bubble policy hurts the seller in state L since it prevents her from exploiting
the buyer, so the second term on the right hand side of (1.18), piL
[
u(eS1 )− u(eS1 + PNPS)
]
,
is negative. Thus, by examining (1.18), it is not obvious whether the seller’s period-1 ex
ante welfare is helped or hurt by anti-bubble policy.
Figure 2 graphs the seller’s period-1 marginal utility (MUS) curve. Notice that it is
downward-sloping indicating her risk-aversion. In the bubble equilibrium, the seller’s period-
1 consumption is eS1 +PNPS in both states L and H. Thus, her period-1 utility in the bubble
equilibrium is the area under her marginal utility curve from point B to the vertical axis.
Under the anti-bubble policy, the seller’s state-L consumption is lowered to eS1 . This
means that her state L utility under the policy is the smaller area under MUS from point A
to the vertical axis. The seller’s state-H consumption under the policy is raised to eS1 +PPS,
with PP > PNP , which means her state-H utility is the larger area under MUS from point
C to the vertical axis.
Thus, in state L, anti-bubble policy causes the seller to lose the area under MUS from
B to A. This area equals
u(eS1 )− u(eS1 + PNPS) =
eS1 +PNPS∫
eS1
u′(c)dc.
In state H, however, the anti-bubble policy causes the seller to gain the area under
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Figure 1.2: The Seller’s period-1 Marginal Utility Curve (MUS)
MUS from B to C. This area equals
u(eS1 + PPS)− u(eS1 + PNPS) =
eS1 +PPS∫
eS1 +PNPS
u′(c)dc.
To determine the overall effect on the seller’s welfare, we build on Holt (2018) by first
examining the impact of anti-bubble policy when changes in the seller’s wealth are evaluated
using marginal utilities for the seller which are held constant at u′(eS1 +PNPS) (see point B
in Figure 2). This produces an estimate of ∆EW S which we’ll call ∆˜EW S. In state L, the
policy causes the seller to lose
u′(eS1 + PNPS)PNPS (1.19)
when MUS is held constant at point B. In Figure 2, this is the area of the rectangle
BLBDDL. This is an underestimate of the true loss, which is the area of the curvi-linear
trapezoid ABDDL. Thus, the state-L loss component in (1.19) underestimates the true
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state-L loss from anti-bubble policy by the amount,
eS1 +PNPS∫
eS1
u′(c)dc− u′(eS1 + PNPS)PNPS > 0. (1.20)
This is the area of the curvi-linear triangle ABBL.
In the state H, the policy causes the seller to gain
u′(eS1 + PNPS)(PP − PNP )S (1.21)
where again MUS is held constant at point B. In Figure 2, this is the area of the rectangle
BBHDHD. This is an overestimate of the seller’s true gain, which is the area of the curvi-
linear trapezoid BCDHD. Thus, the state-H gain component of (21) overestimates the true
gain from anti-bubble policy by the amount,
u′(eS1 + PNPS)(PP − PNP )S −
eS1 +PPS∫
eS1 +PNPS
u′(c)dc > 0. (1.22)
This is the area of the curvi-linear triangle BBHC.
The overall ex ante welfare impact, when MUS is held constant at u
′(eS1 + PNPS), is
then
∆˜EW S = −piLu′(eS1 + PNPS)PNPS + piHu′(eS1 + PNPS)(PP − PNP )S, (1.23)
which can be simplified to
∆˜EW S = −u′(eS1 + PNPS)(PNP − piHPP )S < 0,
where the inequality follows since piHPP < PNP by Lemma II. Thus, the seller’s ex ante
welfare is harmed by the policy when MUS is held constant at u
′(eS1 +PNPS). The additional
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effect of the two curvi-linear triangles in (1.19) and (1.22), comprise the “Hirshleifer effect”
of receiving additional information, which is the welfare loss to agents after becoming more
informed (Hirshleifer (1971); Holt, 2018).6 Combining ∆˜EW S < 0 with this Hirshleifer
effect leads to Proposition I.
Proposition I: The seller is always hurt by anti-bubble policy, so
E∆W S = piH
eS1 +PPS∫
eS1 +PNPS
u′(c)dc− piL
eS1 +PNPS∫
eS1
u′(c)dc < 0.
Proof. We already know that ∆˜EW S < 0. Subtracting piL times the expression in (1.20)
and piH times the expression in (1.22) from ∆˜EW S gives ∆EW
S. This implies ∆EW S <
∆˜EW S < 0.7,8
1.4 Anti-Bubble Policy and the Asset Buyer’s Ex Ante Welfare
1.4.1 The Change in the Buyer’s Ex Ante Expected Welfare
As with the asset seller, define E∆WB as the difference in the buyer’s ex ante welfare
across the different equilibria. Specifically, E∆WB is defined as
∆EWB = EWBP − EWBNP
or
∆EWB = piHu(e
B
1 − PPS) + piLu(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PNPS), (1.24)
6Note that this isn’t exactly a Hirshleifer effect since the seller already knows the true state of the world.
However, since the information revelation doesn’t actually affect the seller’s behavior, but only the buyer’s
behavior, the result is essentially a Hirshleifer effect.
7This result may not hold if the seller’s period-1 endowment differs between state L and state H. Specif-
ically, if the state-H endowment is low relative to the state-L endowment, then the policy improves the
asset’s value as a hedge against the seller’s endowment, so it may be possible for the seller to benefit from
the policy.
8This is intuitive since the policy introduces randomness into asset price, while simultaneously decreasing
its expectation. As a result, the seller’s period-1 consumption falls in expectation, but also becomes random.
This implies that the seller’s ex ante utility must fall since she is risk averse and has local nonsatiation
preferences over consumption. I would like to thank Feng Liu for this helpful insight.
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Figure 1.3: The Buyer’s period-1 Marginal Utility Curve (MUB)
which is found by subtracting EWBNP , in (1.5), from EW
B
P , in (1.9). If ∆EW
B > 0, then
the buyer benefits from an anti-bubble policy, and if ∆EWB < 0, then the buyer is hurt by
an anti-bubble policy.
Notice that, as with the seller, the policy has no effect on the buyer’s period-2 ex ante
welfare, since the policy doesn’t affect his period-2 consumption. This means that analyzing
the policy’s effect on the buyer is equivalent to determining whether the policy lowers or
raises his period-1 expected utility. If piL = 1 − piH is substituted into (1.24), then ∆EWB
can be expressed solely in terms of piH , or
∆EWB =
[
u(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PNPS)
]− piH [u(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PPS)] . (1.25)
Examine (1.25) using the buyer’s marginal utility curve, or u′(c), in Figure 4. The
difference inside the brackets of the first term in (1.25) is the area under u′(c) from point C
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to point B. In other words, it is the integral of u′(c) from eB1 to e
B
1 − PNPS, or
eB1∫
eB1 −PNPS
u′(c) dc =
[
u(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PNPS)
]
. (1.26)
Now examine the difference inside the brackets of the second term in (1.25). This is the area
under u′(c) from point C to point A. In other words, it is the integral of u′(c) from from eB1
to eB1 − PPS, or
eB1∫
eB1 −PPS
u′(c) dc =
[
u(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PPS)
]
. (1.27)
This means that ∆EWB may be rewritten in integral form as
∆EWB =
eB1∫
eB1 −PNPS
u′(c) dc− piH
eB1∫
eB1 −PPS
u′(c) dc. (1.28)
1.4.2 The Impact of Anti-Bubble Policy on the Buyer’s Ex Ante Welfare
We prove that anti-bubble policy improves the asset buyer’s ex ante expected utility
in two environments: the case of linear marginal utility and the case of decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA). The DARA case is the empirically relevant case since actual investors
almost certainly have DARA preferences (see Cohn et al. (1975); Friend and Blume (1977)).
However, we temporarily also consider the linear case since it uses a different strategy of
proof that may provide interesting insights.
1.4.2.1 The Case of Linear Marginal Utility
Figure 4 shows the buyer’s marginal utility (MU) curve when it is linear. The area
of the trapezoid BCDLD in Figure 4 is equivalent to the first term, i.e. (1.26), in (1.25) or
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Figure 1.4: The Buyer’s period-1 Linear Marginal Utility Curve (MUB)
(1.28). Thus, in this linear MU case, (1.26) simply equals
eB1∫
eB1 −PNPS
u′(c) dc =
1
2
[
u′(eB1 − PNPS) + u′(eB1 )
]
PNPS, (1.29)
using the formula for the area of a trapezoid. Furthermore, piH times the the area of the
trapezoid ACDLDH in Figure 4 is equivalent to the second term in (1.25) or (1.28), i.e., piH
times (1.27). In other words, this second term can be rewritten, in the linear MU case, again
using the formula for the area of a trapezoid, as
piH
eB1∫
eB1 −PPS
u′(c) dc =
piH
2
[
u′(eB1 − PPS) + u′(eB1 )
]
PPS. (1.30)
Lastly, subtracting (1.30) from (1.29) gives ∆EWB for the case of linear marginal utility,
∆EWB =
1
2
[
u′(eB1 − PNPS) + u′(eB1 )
]
PNPS − piH
2
[
u′(eB1 − PPS) + u′(eB1 )
]
PPS. (1.31)
This leads to Proposition II.
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Proposition II: The asset buyer benefits from anti-bubble policy, so ∆EWB > 0,
when u′(c) is linear.
Proof. First, multiply (1.31) out to get
∆EWB =
1
2
u′(eB1 − PNPS)PNPS +
1
2
u′(eB1 )PNPS −
piH
2
u′(eB1 − PPS)PPS −
piH
2
u′(eB1 )PPS.
Next, apply (1.11) to the third term, and cancel the first and third terms. This simplifies
the above expression to
∆EWB =
1
2
u′(eB1 )PNPS −
piH
2
u′(eB1 )PPS =
1
2
u′(eB1 )(PNP − piHPP )S < 0,
where the inequality follows since piHPP < PNP by Lemma II.
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1.4.2.2 The Case of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA)
Let R(c) be the buyer’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion when his consumption is
c, so
R(c) = −u
′′(c)
u′(c)
.
Because we assume that the buyer has decreasing absolute risk aversion, it must be true that
R′(c) < 0.
This means that R(c) is increasing in PNP .
In order to prove ∆EWB > 0 for the DARA case, we first determine the relationship
between piH and ∆EW
B. By examining ∆EWB, from (1.25) above, at piH = 1 and piH = 0,
we find that the relationship between piH and ∆EW
B must be something like that shown in
Figure 5. This is because when piH = 1,
∆EWB|piH=1 =
[
u′(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PPS)
]− 1 · [u(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PPS)] = 0,
since PNP = PP when piH = 1. Similarly, when piH = 0,
∆EWB|piH=0 =
[
u(eB1 )− u(eB1 − 0 · S)
]
+ 0 · [u(eB1 )− u(eB1 − PPS)] = 0,
since PNP = 0 when piH = 0.
Figure 5 graphs three hypothetically possible relationships between ∆EWB and piH .
Consider first the relationship labeled I, which is the thick inverted U-shaped graph. If this
is the true relationship between ∆EWB and piH , then ∆EW
B > 0 would be true for all
piH . In other words, if relationship I were the true relation between ∆EW
B and piH , then
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anti-bubble policy would always improve the buyer’s expected welfare. This implies that if
d2∆EWB
dpiH2
< 0 ∀ piH ∈ [0, 1],
then ∆EWB > 0 must also be true for any piH ∈ [0, 1]. Alternatively, if II (or the dashed
U-shaped graph) is the true relationship between ∆EWB and piH , then the buyer’s welfare
is always worsened by anti-bubble policy. Lastly, if the true relationship is as in III, which
is the thin solid curve between I and II, then it’s not possible to place a definitive sign on
∆EWB. We prove that I is the true relationship between ∆EWB and piH . First, we prove
a lemma about the effect of piH on PNP .
Lemma III: PNP is increasing in piH
Proof. Take the derivative of the FOC in (1.2) with respect to piH using implicit differentia-
tion. This gives
u′
(
eB1 − PNPS
) dPNP
dpiH
− u′′ (eB1 − PNPS)PNPSdPNPdpiH = βu′ (eB2 + S) . (1.32)
Since marginal utility is always positive and −u′′(c) > 0, equation (1.32) implies dPNP
dpiH
>
0.
Lemma III should make intuitive sense. The buyer is willing to pay more for the risky
asset when it is more likely that the asset will pay a dividend. A similar intuition applies in
Lemma I. In fact, Lemma I is essentially a special case of Lemma III.
Equation (1.32) can be simplified using the definition of absolute risk aversion when
the buyer consumes eB1 − PNPS. In other words, using
−u′′ (eB1 − PNPS) = R (eB1 − PNPS) · u′ (eB1 − PNPS) ,
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(1.32) can be simplified to
u′
(
eB1 − PNPS
) · dPNP
dpiH
=
βu′
(
eB2 + S
)
1 +R (eB1 − PNPS) · PNPS
. (1.33)
Lemma IV: For a buyer with DARA risk preferences,
d2∆EWB
dpiH2
< 0 ∀ piH ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. First, differentiate (1.25) with respect to piH and use
dPP
dpiH
= 0. This gives
d∆EWB
dpiH
= u
(
eB1 − PPS
)− u (eB1 )+ u′ (eB1 − PNPS) · dPNPdpiH · S. (1.34)
Next, substitute (1.33) into this, which gives
d∆EWB
dpiH
= u
(
eB1 − PPS
)− u (eB1 )+ βu′ (eB2 + S)1 +R (eB1 − PNPS) · PNPS · S. (1.35)
Finally, differentiate (1.35) with respect to piH , again using
dPP
dpiH
= 0. This gives
d2∆EWB
dpiH2
= −βu
′ (eB2 + S) · [R (eB1 − PNPS)−R′ (eB1 − PNPS)PNPS][
1 +R (eB1 − PNPS) · PNPS
]2 · dPNPdpiH · S2 < 0.
This is less than zero because R′(eB1 − PNPS) < 0 and because dPNPdpiH > 0 by Lemma III.
Note that the proof in Lemma IV implies that d
2∆EWB
dpiH2
< 0 is also true when the
buyer has constant absolute risk aversion (or CARA), since R′(c) = 0 in this case.
Proposition III: When the asset buyer has DARA preferences, ∆EWB > 0 for
0 < piH < 1, so the policy benefits the buyer.
Proof. According to Lemma IV, ∆EWB must be strictly concave with respect to piH . Also,
∆EWB = 0 at the endpoints piH = 1 and piH = 0, which means ∆EW
B(piH) is positive
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somewhere in between the endpoints. Thus, by the definition of strict concavity,
∆EWB(piH) > piH ·∆EWB(1) + (1− piH) ·∆EWB(0) = 0
for piH ∈ (0, 1).
1.5 Addition of a Goods Market
In this section we incorporate a goods market, with price rigidities, into the above
model. In the next section, we examine the ex ante welfare impact from anti-bubble policy
to this goods market.
There are two types of goods: cars and apples. The asset buyer consumes cars and
apples in period 2, but he consumes only apples in period 1. Thus, in the model presented so
far, the perishable endowment good that the buyer consumed is equivalent to these apples.
Additionally, we introduce a third type of agent called workers. These workers provide
differentiated labor, and each worker operates as a monopolist in the specific kind of labor
they provide. The workers sell their labor to a market of competitive, constant-return-to-
scale car producers. The car producers combine the labor from the workers to produce cars,
which are then sold to the asset buyers. As shown in Figure 6, the producers will receive
payment in the form of apples for the cars that they sell to the buyers, and the workers will
receive payment in apples for the labor they provide to the car producers. Since the industry
of car producers is competitive with constant returns to scale, their profits will be zero, so
analyzing the welfare of the car production industry will involve examining only the welfare
of the workers.
The complete macroeconomic model is intended to reflect Keynes’s notion of an econ-
omy with a volatile asset market and a sluggish goods market. We therefore employ Fischer
(1977)-style pricing in our car market to reflect a goods market with sticky prices (Fischer
(1977)). Specifically, the monopolist workers set their wages, in terms of apples, in period 1,
based on their expectations of the buyers’ period-2 demand for cars. However, the buyer’s
25
Seller Buyer
Apple Trees
Apples
Seller Buyer
Producers
Producers
Apples
Cars
Period 1
Period 2
Workers
Workers
Apples
Labor
Figure 1.6: The Structure of the Macroeconomic Model
demand for cars in period 2 is uncertain, since it is contingent on the state of the world i.e., on
whether or not the apple trees actually yield a positive dividend of apples in period 2. In the
absence of policy, the workers must choose their period-2 wages in period 1 without access
to the seller’s information concerning the true state. Because car producers are competitive
with constant-returns to scale, this means that the price of cars (in terms of apples) will
be determined by the wages set in period 1, even though the production and consumption
of cars does not occur until period 2. The question is then whether an anti-bubble policy,
which reveals asset sellers’ knowledge to wage-setting workers, improves welfare for both the
workers and the buyers in the goods market.
1.5.1 The Buyers
The asset seller does not consume any cars, so the analysis of her behavior is un-
changed from that already presented. However, the asset buyer does consume cars, and his
consumption of cars depends on the state of the world as well as on the central bank’s policy
regime. In the absence of policy, the buyer’s expected utility is
EUB = u(eB1 −PX)+piHβ
[
u(eB2 +X − P cNP cHNP ) + v(cHNP )
]
+piLβ
[
u(eB2 − P cNP ) + v(cLNP )
]
,
(1.36)
where cHNP is the number of cars that the buyer consumes in state H, c
L
NP is the number of
cars he consumes is state L, v(c) is the utility that the buyer receives from cars, and P cNP is
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the price of cars in terms of apples.9 Note that, in the absence of policy, workers are unable
to distinguish L from H in period 1, so the wages they choose will be the same in both
states of the world in period 2, because the workers choose their wages in period 1. Thus,
since the producer market is competitive with constant returns to scale, the price of cars will
be proportional the workers’ wage in equilibrium. As a result, the price of cars will the be
the same in both states of the bubble equilibrium. This is how we captures Keynesian price
stickiness.
The buyer chooses his period-2 consumption of apples and cars as a function of his
period-2 wealth for each state L and H. He then chooses the number of shares that he wishes
to purchase in period 1, which ultimately will determine his period-2 wealth. Of course, as
above, we choose parameters so that, in equilibrium, he will purchase all of the asset-seller’s
shares, so X = S.
In the absence of policy, the buyer’s FOC for cH in period 2, given his asset purchases,
X, is
u′
(
eB2 +X − P cNP cHNP
)
P cNP = v
′(cHNP ), (1.37)
and his FOC for cLNP is
u′
(
eB2 − P cNP cLNP
)
P cNP = v
′(cLNP ). (1.38)
The FOC in (1.37) determines the buyer’s demand for cars in state H, while the FOC in
(1.38) determines his demand for cars in state L.
The buyer’s FOC with respect to X is then
u′(eB1 − PX)P = piHβ
[
u′(eB2 +X − P cNP cHNP )
(
1− P cNP
dcHNP
dX
)
+ v′(cHNP )
dcHNP
dX
]
.
By (1.37), the terms involving dcHNP/dX cancel, so this can be simplified to
u′(eB1 − PX)P = piHβu′(eB2 +X − P cNP cHNP ) (1.39)
9In other words, the buyer pays P cNP apples in order to receive one car.
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(this is essentially the Envelope Theorem). Equation (1.39) then determines the buyer’s
demand for the asset. Note that, since the asset does not pay a dividend in state L, cLNP is
unaffected by the buyer’s choice of X. Again, we choose parameters such that, in equilibrium,
the buyer purchases all of the seller’s shares of the asset, so X = S. This means (1.37) and
(1.39), respectively, become
u′(eB2 + S − P cNP cHNP )P cNP = v′(cHNP ), (1.40)
u′(eB1 − PNPS)PNP = piHβu′(eB2 + S − P cNP cHNP ). (1.41)
Next, under an anti-bubble policy, the monopolist workers will adjust their wages to
reflect the different demands for cars across states L and H. This will cause the price of cars
in state L to differ from that in state H (presumably P cL < P
c
H). Thus, the buyer’s demand
for cars in state H of a no-bubble equilibrium is given by
u′(eB2 + S − P cHcHP )P cH = v′(cHP ), (1.42)
where cHP is the buyer’s state-H consumption of cars under an anti-bubble policy, and we
again assume that the buyers purchases all S shares of the asset. Similarly, the buyer’s
demand for cars in state L of a no-bubble equilibrium is given by
u′(eB2 − P cLcLP )P cL = v′(cLP ), (1.43)
where cLP is the buyer’s state-L consumption of cars under an anti-bubble policy.
Under an anti-bubble policy, the buyer will not purchase the asset in state L since he
knows that it will not pay a dividend. As a result, (1.43) is the only relevant FOC for the
buyer in state L of the policy equilibrium. However, in state H the buyer will continue to
purchase the asset in order to intertemporally smooth his consumption of apples and allow
him to increase his consumption of cars in period 2. As in the model of a semi-bubble above,
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the state-H asset price under the policy will be higher than the no-policy price since the
buyer has a higher WTP. The buyer’s WTP, PP , in state H of the no-bubble equilibrium is
determined by
u′(eB1 − PPS)PP = βu′(eB2 + S − P cHcHP ). (1.44)
Because the asset price does not affect the asset’s period-2 dividend, the buyer’s
period-2 welfare is uanffected by the period-1 asset price. As a result, we only need to focus
on the buyer’s period-2 utility when analyzing how anti-bubble policy affects his welfare in
the goods market. Thus, in the context of the goods market, the buyer’s welfare in the
absence of anti-bubble policy is
EW g,BNP = piH
[
u(eB2 + S − P cNP cHNP ) + v(cHNP )
]
+ piL
[
u(eB2 − P cNP cLNP ) + v(cLNP )
]
,
while his welfare in the presence of anti-bubble policy is
EW g,BP = piH
[
u(eB2 + S − P cHcHP ) + v(cHP )
]
+ piL
[
u(eB2 − P cLcLP ) + v(cLP )
]
,
where g signifies “goods market.” This means that
∆EWBg = EW
g,B
P − EW g,BNP ,
provides a measure of how anti-bubble policy affects buyers in the goods market. We can
also break up ∆EWBg into the two components ∆EU
B
2 and ∆EU
B
c , such that
∆EWBg = ∆EU
B
2 + ∆EU
B
c (1.45)
29
where
∆EUB2 =
[
piHu(e
B
2 + S − P cHcHP ) + piLu(eB2 − P cLcLP )
]
− [piHu(eB2 + S − P cNP cHNP ) + piLu(eB2 − P cNP cLNP )] , (1.46)
and
∆EUBc =
[
piHv(c
H
P ) + piLv(c
L
P )
]− [piHv(cHNP ) + piLv(cLNP )] . (1.47)
In general terms, ∆EUB2 measures the impact of anti-bubble policy on the buyer’s ex ante
expected utility from consuming apples in period 2, and ∆EUBc measures the impact of anti-
bubble policy on the buyer’s ex ante expected utility from consuming cars. Thus, buyers
benefit from anti-bubble policy if ∆EWBg > 0, but they are hurt by anti-bubble policy if
∆EWBg < 0. Our goal is to determine the sign of ∆EW
B
g under the most general conditions.
1.5.2 The Workers and Producers in the Goods Market
There is a unit mass continuum of workers who, as monopolists, sell their labor to a
competitive industry of car producers. Each worker has the utility function
UW = wiLi − C(Li), (1.48)
where is Li is the amount of labor that worker i sells, wi is the wage in apples that s/he
receives, wiLi is the number of apples s/he consumes, and C(Li) is the worker’s utility cost
of labor.
Car producers combine the labor of the workers to produce cars. The production
technology for the car producers has constant returns to scale and is expressed as the CES
production function
c =
 1∫
0
Lγi di

1
γ
, (1.49)
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which may be rewritten as
cγ =
1∫
0
Lγi di. (1.50)
Assume 0 < γ < 1.
Given the wage wi for the labor input of the i
th worker, producers choose each Li so
as to minimize their cost of production
1∫
0
wiLi di
given their constraint (1.47). Thus, producers choose Li to minimize the Lagrangian
1∫
0
wiLi di+ λ
cγ − 1∫
0
Lγi di
 . (1.51)
The first order condition for Li is
wi − λγLγ−1i = 0
which gives
Li =
(
γλ
wi
)1/(1−γ)
. (1.52)
Plugging this back into the production function in (1.47) gives, after some rearrangement,
λ =
1
γ
 1∫
0
w
−γ/(1−γ)
i di
−(1−γ)/γ c1−γ = 1
γ
Wc1−γ (1.53)
where
W =
 1∫
0
w
−γ/(1−γ)
i di
−(1−γ)/γ (1.54)
is a wage index. Plugging (1.50) into (1.49) gives the Hicksian labor demand for labor input
31
iLi =
(
W
wi
)1/(1−γ)
c. (1.55)
Worker i’s total consumption of apples, wiLi, is constrained by the demand for labor
by car producers, which is ultimately determined by the demand for cars by asset buyers.
This means that we can express worker i’s apple consumption as
ckA2i = wiLi = wi
(
W
wi
)1/(1−γ)
ck = (wi)
−γ/1−γ (W )1/(1−γ) ck k = L,H (1.56)
where ckA2i is worker i’s consumption of apples in period 2 in state k = L,H, and c
k is the
total demand for cars by asset buyers in period 2, state k = L,H.
In the absence of policy, worker i must choose a monopoly wage wi in period 1, before
the demand for cars in known. Supplying labor Li yields a disutility of C(Li) to worker i,
as in (1.45) above. Worker i supplies LHi units of labor in state H and L
L
i units of labor in
state L, as determined by the demand they face, at the wage wi. Worker i therefore chooses
the wage wi to maximize his/her expected utility, or
EUW = piH
(
cHA2i − C(LHi )
)
+ piL
(
cLA2i − C(LLi )
)
, (1.57)
where LHi and L
L
i are determined by (1.52), given wi and the demand for cars, c
H and cL,
respectively. Note that this requires wi to be larger than C
′(Lki ) for k = L,H (see below).
In order to find the worker’s FOC, differentiate (1.54) with respect to wi and use
∂Lki
∂wi
=
−1
1− γ
(
1
wi
)
Lki and
∂ckA2i
∂wi
=
−γ
1− γL
k
i where k = L,H
by (1.52) and (1.53), respectively. This gives
piH
[
− γ
1− γL
H
i + C
′(LHi ) ·
1
1− γ ·
1
wi
LHi
]
+ piL
[
− γ
1− γL
L
i + C
′(LLi ) ·
1
1− γ ·
1
wi
LLi
]
= 0,
(1.58)
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which yields
wi =
1
γ
[
piLL
L
i
piLLLi + piHL
H
i
C ′(LLi ) +
piHL
H
i
piLLLi + piHL
H
i
C ′(LHi )
]
, (1.59)
where is wi is greater than C
′(Lki ) for k = L,H if γ is far enough below 1.
Next, we assume that all producers are identical, which means wi = wj = w and
Lki = L
k
j = L
k for all i, j ∈ [0, 1] and k = L,H. The latter assumption implies cL = LL and
cH = LH , by (1.46). Furthermore, since the producer market is competitive, the price of a
car in units of apples is P c = W = w. As a result, the competitive equilibrium price of a
car is given by
P cNP =
1
γ
[
piLc
L
NP
piLcLNP + piHc
H
NP
C ′(cLNP ) +
piHc
H
NP
piLcLNP + piHc
H
NP
C ′(cHNP )
]
. (1.60)
In the presence on an anti-bubble policy, the workers know the demand for cars
with certainty when choosing their wage. Thus, there are two car prices in a no-bubble
equilibrium. For instance, P cL is the price of a car in state L under the policy, which is given
by
P cL =
1
γ
C ′(cLP ), (1.61)
where cLP is the production and demand for cars in state L under the policy. Similarly, P
H
P
is the price of a car in state H under the policy, which is given by
P cH =
1
γ
C ′(cHP ), (1.62)
where cHP is the production and demand for cars in state H under the policy.
Examining the welfare impact of anti-bubble policy on the worker entails comparing
the worker’s expected utility in a bubble equilibrium with his expected utility in a no-bubble
equilibrium. In the absence of policy, the worker’s expected utility is
EUWNP = piH
(
P cNP c
H
NP − C(cHNP )
)
+ piL
(
P cNP c
L
NP − C(cLNP )
)
, (1.63)
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and his expected utility under the policy is
EUWP = piH
(
P cHc
H
P − C(cHP )
)
+ piL
(
P cLc
L
P − C(cLP )
)
. (1.64)
Thus, we can measure the impact of anti-bubble policy on the worker by the difference
between (1.61) and (1.60), or
E∆UW = EUWP − EUWNP . (1.65)
If E∆UW > 0, then workers benefit from anti-bubble policy, and if E∆UW < 0, then workers
are hurt by anti-bubble policy. As with E∆W S for the asset seller and E∆WB for the buyer
in Section 4 above, our goal is to determine the sign of E∆UW for the worker under the
most general conditions possible.
1.6 A Conjecture Concerning Goods Prices Across Policy and No-Policy Equilibria
In a policy equilibrium, producers know the future demand for cars with certainty.
In this equilibrium, a regime where the producer must set the period-2 car price in period 1
will have the same outcome as a regime where the car producer is able to set this car price
in period 2. This means that a policy equilibrium is essentially equivalent to an economy
where car prices are always flexible. As a result, we could alternatively refer to the no-policy
equilibrium as a “sticky-price equilibrium,” and we could refer to the policy equilibrium as a
“flexible-price equilibrium.” This implies that anti-bubble policy converts sticky prices into
flexible prices.
We conjecture that when workers have increasing marginal utility cost of effort, the
goods price in a no-policy equilibrium lies between the two state-contingent goods prices in
a policy equilibrium, so
P cL < P
c
NP < P
c
H . (1.66)
This should be somewhat intuitive, since price setters in a no-policy regime would presumably
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set P cNP according to some weighted average of P
c
L and P
c
H . The next two sections provide
specifications of the model whereby we can easily demonstrate that this conjecture is true.
The main insight from this conjecture, assuming it’s true, is that it necessarily means that the
volatility of the production and consumption of cars is greater in a no-policy equilibrium than
it is in a policy equilibrium. In other words, this conjecture implies that sticky goods prices
amplify the variance of car production that arises from asset-driven changes to demand.
Figure 7 graphs the “quasi-supply” and demand for cars. Since the demand for cars
is contingent on the state of the world, there are two demand curves, DcL and D
c
H . For any
given car price, the buyer’s demand in state H, DcH , is larger than his demand in state L, D
c
L,
since the buyer’s state-H wealth is larger than his state-L wealth. The “quasi-supply” curve
is “quasi” because the price on the curve is greater than the monopolist workers’ marginal
cost curve by the factor 1
γ
> 1. This means workers would still be willing to produce at levels
where the car price is below the QSc curve, such as at cHNP , as long as the price is greater
than marginal cost. As Figure 7 shows, the production and consumption of cars is more
volatile in no-policy or sticky-price equilibrium. Car production in state L of a no-policy
equilibrium is lower than it would be in a policy equilibrium, while car production in state H
of a no-policy equilibrium is larger than it would be in a policy equilibrium. In a Kenyesian
sense, we could say that the existing car production volatility, which is driven by volatility
in asset markets, is amplified when car prices are sticky.
1.6.1 Car Production
The quasi-supply curve QSc shown in Figure 7 corresponds to the product of the
mark up 1/γ and workers’ marginal cost function C ′(c), so that, when the demand curve
moves, QSc doesn’t move. In other words, QSc in Figure 7 is simply a generalized version
of the workers’ FOC in a policy equilibrium like those shown in equations (1.61) and (1.62).
This QSc curve is not a supply curve, but rather a “quasi-supply curve,” because the workers
are monopolists and supply curves do not exist in monopoly-market equilibria. Thus, the
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Figure 1.7: Genera Model of Demand and Quasi-Supply of Cars
car price P˜ c that producers choose to charge for producing c˜ units of cars is determined
according to the quasi-supply curve
P˜ c =
1
γ
C ′(c˜). (1.67)
If C ′′(c˜) = 0, so C ′(c˜) = λ, say, with λ constant, then QSc is a horizontal line, and, regardless
of the state of the world and/or the bubble-policy equilibrium, the car price is simply P˜ c = λ
γ
,
where λ is a constant marginal (utility) cost of car production. An example of this is shown
in Figure 8 below. On the other hand, if C ′′(c˜) > 0, then QSc is upward-sloping like in
Figure 7. If C(3)(c˜) = 0, then QSc is upward-sloping and linear, and if C(3)(c˜) > 0, then QSc
is upward-sloping and convex.
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1.6.2 The Demand for Cars
The buyer’s period-2 FOC with respect to car consumption determines his demand
for cars. So, for a given car price P˜ c, the buyer’s demand for cars c˜ is determined by
u′
(
A˜− P˜ cc˜
)
P˜ c = v′ (c˜) , (1.68)
where A˜ is the buyer’s period-2 state-contingent wealth such that
A˜ =

AL = e
B
2 : in state L
AH = e
B
2 + S: in state H
(1.69)
Note that the policy doesn’t affect the demand curves for cars, since buyers’ period-2 wealth,
given by (1.69), is not affected by the policy. This is because we assume asset sellers are
always short-sale constrained so that buyers always purchase all available shares of the risky
asset. Thus, the only effect of policy on the goods market is whether sellers can use the
information revealed to set prices. Equation (1.68) is a generalization of the state-and-
equilibrium specific FOCs in (1.38), (1.40), (1.42), (1.43). The buyer’s expected period-2
wealth is
E
[
A˜
]
= piLe
B
2 + piH
(
eB2 + S
)
= eB2 + piHS, (1.70)
while the variance of his period-2 wealth is
V ar
[
A˜
]
= piLpiHS
2. (1.71)
Holding A˜ constant, the derivative of (1.68) with respect to P˜ c is,
dc˜
dP˜ c
=
u′
(
A˜− P˜ cc˜
)
− u′′
(
A˜− P˜ cc˜
)
· P˜ cc˜
u′′
(
A˜− P˜ cc˜
)
·
(
P˜ c
)2
+ v′′ (c˜)
< 0. (1.72)
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This is less than zero since u′′ (·) < 0, u′ (·) > 0, and v′′ (·) < 0. Thus, the buyer’s demand
curve for cars is downward slopping as expected. Now, holding P˜ c constant, the derivative
of (1.68) with respect to A˜ is
dc˜
dA˜
=
u′′
(
A˜− P˜ cc˜
)
·
(
P˜ c
)2
+ v′′ (c˜)
u′′
(
A˜− P˜ cc˜
)
· P˜ c
> 0, (1.73)
which is greater than zero because u′′ (·) < 0 and v′′ (·) < 0. Thus, for a constant car price,
a positive wealth shock to the buyer will increase his demand for cars, as expected.
1.7 A Welfare Analysis of the Goods Market when Workers have Constant Marginal Utility-
Costs
First, note that
E [c˜NP ] = piLc
L
NP + piHc
H
NP
is the buyer’s expected consumption of cars in a no-policy equilibrium. This means that we
can rewrite (1.60) as
P cE [c˜NP ] =
1
γ
[
piLc
L
NPC
′ (cLNP )+ piHcHNPC ′ (cHNP )] , (1.74)
where P cE [c˜NP ] is the expected revenue that worker’s receive from providing labor for car
production in a no-policy equilibrium. In this section, we assume C (c˜) = λc˜, where λ is a
constant, so C ′ (c˜) = λ. Using (1.74), this implies that the car price in no-policy equilibrium
is P cNP =
λ
γ
. Substituting C ′ (c˜) = λ into the policy FOCs in (1.62) and (1.61), we find that
the car prices for states L and H are also P cL = P
c
H = P
c
NP =
λ
γ
, so the equilibrium car price
is unaffected by the state of the world as well as the central bank’s policy on asset bubbles.
As a result, the state-L production of cars is the same across the two policy equilibria, so
cLNP = c
L
P . The same it true for the state-H production of cars, so c
H
NP = c
H
P . This is shown
in Figure 8.
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Figure 1.8: Demand and Quasi-Supply for Cars when C ′ (·) = λ.
The result from Figure 8 implies that the worker’s expected revenue in a no-policy
equilibrium, or E
[
R˜NP
]
= P cE [c˜NP ], is the same as his expected revenue in a policy
equilibrium, or E
[
R˜P
]
= piLP
c
Lc
L
P + piHP
c
Hc
H
P . The same is true for his expected total costs,
so E [C (c˜NP )] = E [C (c˜P )] . Thus, if workers have constant marginal costs, then their ex
ante expected welfare is unaffected by anti-bubble policy, so E∆UW = EWP − EUWNP = 0.
This is obvious, since price-setters don’t use information from the asset market even if they
have it, so they don’t care whether the policy reveals this information.
1.8 A Welfare Analysis of the Goods Market with Logarithmic Utility and Quadratic Costs
In this section, we assume u (·) = v (·) = ln (·). This is a Cobb-Douglas utility
function, so the buyer always spends a constant proportion of his wealth on cars. Thus,
when P˜ c increases (decreases), c˜ decreases (increases), but P˜ cc˜ remains unchanged. We also
assume
C (c˜) =
λ
2
c˜2,
39
which means
C ′ (c˜) = λc˜.
1.8.1 Consumption and Production in a No-Policy Equilibrium
In a no-policy equilibrium, the buyer’s state-H FOC (1.40) becomes
P cNP
eB + S − P cNP cHNP
=
1
cHNP
, (1.75)
and his state-L FOC (1.38) becomes
P cNP
eB − P cNP cLNP
=
1
cLNP
. (1.76)
The buyer receives all of his wealth as apples, so we let apples be the numeraire good.
Because the buyer has Cobb-Douglas utility, he spends a constant proportion of his wealth
on cars, so for a given level of wealth A˜, the amount of apples spent on cars does not change.
Thus, Equations (1.75) and (1.76), respectively, imply
P cNP c
H
NP =
eB2 + S
2
=
AH
2
(1.77)
in state H and
P cNP c
L
NP =
eB2
2
=
AL
2
(1.78)
in state L. More generally,
P cNP c˜NP =
A˜
2
, (1.79)
so half of the buyer’s wealth is spent on car consumption, and the buyer’s demand for cars
can be expressed as
c˜NP =
A˜
2P cNP
. (1.80)
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Thus, the workers’ expected revenue in a no-policy equilibrium is
E
[
R˜NP
]
= P cNPE [c˜NP ] =
1
2
E
[
A˜
]
. (1.81)
The worker’s FOC (1.60) becomes
P cNP =
1
γ
[
piLc
L
NP
E [c˜NP ]
· λcLNP +
piHc
H
NP
E [c˜NP ]
· λcHNP
]
, (1.82)
which may be written more concisely as
P cNP =
λ
γ
[
E
[
(c˜NP )
2]
E [c˜NP ]
]
=
2
γ
[
E [C (c˜NP )]
E [c˜NP ]
]
. (1.83)
Equation (1.83) says that the car price in a no-policy equilibrium is a mark-up of 2
γ
on the
ratio of the expected cost over the expected consumption/production. Equation (1.83) can
also be written as
P cNPE [c˜NP ] =
λ
γ
E
[
(c˜NP )
2] = 2
γ
E [C (c˜NP )] , (1.84)
so that expected revenue is greater than the expected cost by a factor of 2
γ
. Substituting
(1.81) and (1.80) into (1.84) gives
1
2
E
[
A˜
]
=
λ
γ
E
( A˜
2P cNP
)2 ,
which simplifies to
(P cNP )
2 =
2λ
4γ
E
[
A˜2
]
E
[
A˜
] ,
and finally gives
P cNP = q ·
√√√√√E
[
A˜2
]
E
[
A˜
] , (1.85)
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where q =
√
λ
2γ
. Substituting
E
[
A˜2
]
= V ar
[
A˜
]
+ E
[
A˜
]2
,
into (1.85) and canceling common factors gives
P cNP = q ·
√√√√√V ar
[
A˜
]
E
[
A˜
] + E [A˜]. (1.86)
Finally, substituting E
[
A˜
]
= eB2 + piHS and V ar
[
A˜
]
= piLpiHS
2, from (1.70) and (1.71)
respectively, into (1.86) gives
P cNP = q ·
√
piLpiHS2
eB2 + piHS
+ (eB2 + piHS).
This can be written more concisely as
P cNP = q ·
√
eB2 + (piLδ + piH)S, (1.87)
where
δ =
piHS
eB2 + piHS
< 1,
which implies (piLδ + piH) < 1, so
AL = eB2 < e
B
2 + piHS = E
[
A˜
]
< eB2 + (piLδ + piH)S < e
B
2 + S = A
H . (1.88)
The inequalities in (1.88) will be used in the next section to show that our conjecture in
(1.66) is true for the present case.
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1.8.2 Consumption and Production in a Policy Equilibrium
In a policy equilibrium (or no-bubble equilibrium), the buyer’s state-H FOC (1.42)
becomes
P cH
eB2 + S − P cHcHP
=
1
cHP
, (1.89)
and his state-L FOC (1.43) becomes
P cL
eB2 − P cLcLP
=
1
cLP
. (1.90)
The amount of the buyer’s wealth that is spent on cars in state H is then
P cHc
H
P =
eB2 + S
2
=
AH
2
, (1.91)
and the amount of his wealth spent on cars in state L is
P cLc
L
P =
eB2
2
=
AL
2
. (1.92)
Thus, comparing (1.91) and (1.92) to (1.77) and (1.78) shows that, for each state of the world,
anti-bubble policy does not affect the amount of apples the buyer spends on cars. This means
that workers’ expected revenue in a policy equilibrium, E
[
R˜P
]
= piLP
c
Lc
L
P + piHP
c
Hc
H
P , is the
same as their expected revenue in a no-policy equilibrium, so
E
[
R˜P
]
= E
[
R˜NP
]
=
1
2
E
[
A˜
]
. (1.93)
Next, applying C ′ (c˜) = λc˜ to (1.67), the worker’s FOC in state H is
P cH =
λ
γ
cHP . (1.94)
Multiplying both sides of (1.94) by P cH , using (1.91) on the right-hand side, and solving for
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P cH gives
P cH = q ·
√
eB2 + S = q ·
√
AH . (1.95)
Similarly, multiplying both sides of
P cL =
λ
γ
cLP , (1.96)
by P cL, using (1.92) on the right-hand side, and solving for P
c
L gives
P cL = q ·
√
eB2 = q ·
√
AL. (1.97)
Applying (1.88) to (1.87), (1.97), and (1.95) implies that P cL < P
c
NP < P
c
H . Thus, when
u (·) = v (·) = ln (·) and C (c˜) = λ
2
(c˜)2, our conjecture in (1.66) is true.
The ex ante expected car price in a policy equilibrium is
E
[
P˜P
]
= piLP
c
L + piHP
c
H = q · E
[√
A˜
]
, (1.98)
which is found using (1.95) and (1.97). Furthermore, by Jensen’s Inequality, we know that
E
[√
A˜
]
<
√
E
[
A˜
]
,
so because E
[
A˜
]
= eB2 + piHS < e
B
2 + (piLδ + piH)S, it must be the case that
E
[
P˜P
]
< P cNP ,
using (1.87) and (1.98). Thus, anti-bubble policy decreases the ex ante expected car price,
which suggests that anti-bubble policy may increase the buyer’s expected consumption of
cars. We therefore conjecture that
E [c˜P ] > E [c˜NP ] ,
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which we prove in Lemma VI.
1.8.3 The Worker’s Ex Ante Expected Welfare
As already shown in (1.93), anti-bubble policy does not affect the the worker’s ex-
pected revenue in the present case. It turns out that anti-bubble policy does not affect
the worker’s expected cost either. This is shown in Lemma V. It will therefore follow that
anti-bubble policy doesn’t affect workers’ welfare, as is shown in Proposition IV.
Lemma V: If u (·) = v (·) = ln (·) and C (c˜) = λ
2
(c˜)2, then E [C (c˜NP )] =
E [C (c˜P )].
Proof. Using (1.94), the state-H revenue in a policy equilibrium can be rewritten as
P cHc
H
P =
λ
γ
(
cHP
)2
=
2
γ
C
(
cHP
)
. (1.99)
Similarly, using (1.96), the state-L revenue in a policy equilibrium can be rewritten as
P cLc
L
P =
λ
γ
(
cLP
)2
=
2
γ
C
(
cLP
)
. (1.100)
Thus, the expected revenue in a policy equilibrium is
E
[
R˜P
]
= piL
2
γ
C
(
cLP
)
+ piH
2
γ
C
(
cHP
)
=
2
γ
E [C (c˜P )] . (1.101)
Combining this with (1.93) and (1.84) gives
2
γ
E [C (c˜P )] = E
[
R˜P
]
= E
[
R˜NP
]
= P cNPE [c˜NP ] =
2
γ
E [C (c˜NP )] , (1.102)
which implies Lemma V.
Proposition IV: If u (·) = v (·) = ln (·) and C (c˜) = λ
2
(c˜)2, then E∆UW = 0.
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Proof. Rewrite (1.63) and (1.64), respectively, as
EUWNP = E
[
R˜NP
]
− E [C (c˜NP )] (1.103)
and
EUWP = E
[
R˜P
]
− E [C (c˜P )] , (1.104)
so, using Lemma V and (1.93), E∆UW is
E∆UW = E
[
R˜P
]
− E
[
R˜NP
]
+ E [C (c˜NP )]− E [C (c˜P )] = 0. (1.105)
1.8.4 The Buyer’s Ex Ante Expected Welfare
First, consider the buyer’s period-2 consumption of apples. Because P cNP c
H
NP = P
c
Hc
H
P
and P cNP c
L
NP = P
c
Lc
L
P , anti-bubble policy does not impact the buyers’ period-2 spending on
cars, and so, does not impact their period-2 apple consumption. It therefore does not affect
their period-2 ex ante expected utility of apple consumption. That is,
piLu
(
eB2 − P cNP cLNP
)
+piHu
(
eB2 + S − P cNP cHNP
)
= piLu
(
eB2 − P cLcLP
)
+piHu
(
eB2 + S − P cHcHP
)
.
(1.106)
Thus, the effect of policy, ∆EWBg , depends solely on the buyers’ expected utility from
consumption of cars, which we call ∆EUBc , so
∆EWBg = ∆EU
B
c , (1.107)
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where
∆EUBc =
[
piLv
(
cLP
)
+ piHv
(
cHP
)]− [piLv (cLNP )+ piHv (cHNP )] = E [v (c˜P )]− E [v (c˜NP )] .
(1.108)
Lemma VI: If u (·) = v (·) = ln (·) and C (c˜) = λ
2
(c˜)2, then E [c˜P ] > E [c˜NP ].
Proof. Let GsNP (c˜) be the formula for the secant line that runs from C
(
cLNP
)
to C
(
cHNP
)
on
the worker’s total cost curve (see Figure 9), so that
GsNP (E [c˜NP ]) = E [C (c˜NP )] . (1.109)
Likewise, let GsP (c˜) be the policy-equilibrium analog of G
s
NP (c˜), so that
GsP (E [c˜P ]) = E [C (c˜P )] . (1.110)
As shown in Figure 9, GsNP (c) > G
s
P (c) for any c in the open interval (c
L
P , c
H
P ), so
GsNP (E [c˜P ]) > G
s
P (E [c˜P ]) .
Applying Lemma V, together with (1.109) and (1.110), gives
GsNP (E [c˜P ]) > G
s
P (E [c˜P ]) = G
s
NP (E [c˜NP ]) ,
which implies
E [c˜P ] > E [c˜NP ] .
Thus, anti-bubble policy increases the buyer’s expected car consumption. Intuitively,
since c˜NP is more volatile and C (·) is convex, all else equal, one would expect E [C (c˜NP )] >
E [C (c˜P )]. Yet, as Lemma V shows, they are in fact equal, so it must be true that E [c˜NP ] <
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Figure 1.9: Expected Costs of Car Production
E [c˜P ]
Lemma VII: If u (·) = v (·) = ln (·) and C (c˜) = λ
2
(c˜)2, then E [v (c˜P )] >
E [v (c˜NP )].
Proof. This is intuitively clear. Because v (·) = ln (·), the buyer is risk averse and also prefers
more consumption over less. Thus, anti-bubble policy increases E [v (c˜)] because the buyer’s
car consumption is less volatile and larger in expected value in a policy equilibrium than it
is in a no-policy equilibrium. This is easily seen is Figure 10.10
Proposition V: If u (·) = v (·) = ln (·) and C (c˜) = λ
2
c˜2, then ∆EWB > 0.
Proof. First, note that ∆EWB can be broken up into three parts, in terms of apple con-
sumption in period 1, apple consumption in period 2, and car production in period 2. This
gives
∆EWB = ∆EUB1 + ∆EU
B
2 + ∆EU
B
c ,
10I wish to thank Feng Liu for impressing on me the importance of analyzing ex ante expected welfare
changes through a graphical method like that in Figure 10.
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Figure 1.10: Expected Utility of Car Consumption
where
∆EUB1 = piHu
(
eB1 − PPS
)
+ piLu
(
eB1
)− u (eB1 − PNPS)
∆EUB2 =
[
piHu
(
eB2 + S − P cHcHP
)
+ piLu
(
eB2 − P cLcLP
)]
− [piHu (eB2 + S − P cNP cHNP )+ piLu (eB2 − P cNP cLNP )]
∆EUBc =
[
piLv
(
cLP
)
+ piHv
(
cHP
)]− [piLv (cLNP )+ piHv (cHNP )] .
Proposition III implies that ∆EUB1 > 0 since ln (·) is an example of a DARA utility func-
tion.11 Equation (1.106) implies ∆EUB2 = 0. Finally, Lemma VII implies ∆EU
B
c > 0.
11Recall that Proposition III relies on Lemma IV which shows that, in the absence of a goods (car)
market in period 2, ∆EUB1 is a concave function in piH , i.e., when v (·) = 0. To prove Lemma IV, we
took the second derivative of (??) with respect to piH and showed that it is less than zero. If a goods
market is present in period 2, then piHβu
′ (eB2 + S) from the right-hand side of (1.2) must be replaced with
piHβu
′ (eB2 + S − P cNP cHNP ) in the FOC (1.41). However, because the buyer has Cobb-Douglas utility, then
P cNP c
H
NP =
eB2 +S
2 , so
d P cNP c
H
NP
d piH
= 0. This implies that the second derivative of (1.2) must have the same
sign as the second derivative of (1.41), which is negative.
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1.9 Conclusion
In summary, we find that anti-bubble policy decreases the ex ante welfare of asset
sellers because it decreases their expected consumption while increasing the volatility of their
consumption across states of the world. On the other hand, asset buyers appear to benefit
from anti-bubble policy. In the absence of a goods market, anti-bubble policy increases the
asset buyers’ ex ante expected welfare when they have DARA preferences, because the utility
gains from a larger expected consumption outweighs the the utility loses from more volatile
cross-state consumption. Asset buyers also benefit from anti-bubble policy, for certain utility
and cost specifications, when a goods market is incorporated into the model. Specifically,
for the logarithmic utility, quadratic cost case, anti-bubble policy improves the asset buyer’s
ex ante expected utility in the goods market. Finally, in both specifications of our goods
market, anti-bubble policy does not have any effect on the ex ante expected welfare of
workers/producers in the goods market.
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CHAPTER 2
Three-State Rational Greater-Fool Bubbles
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the general conditions under which a strong bubble can exist
in a three-state, three-period model with multi-period consumption. We first examines the
simplest case of the model where only one asset is available to trade: the risky bubble asset.
Next, we show that a strong bubble is still possible even when endowments are durable.
Finally, we introduce a risk-free asset into our strong bubble model of a greater-fool bubble.
In this section, we demonstrate that a strong bubble is not possible when a risk-free asset
is traded in period 1. However, related work from Conlon et al. (2019) shows that a strong
bubble can coexist with a risk-free asset in models with four states of the world.
2.2 A Simple Bubble
2.2.1 Setup and Equilibrium
This appendix considers the general case of a three-state, three-period strong bubble
model, with only one asset available to trade, which is risky. In this general case, agent j
faces the following expected utility maximization problem in his/her period-1 information
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set Ij1,i,
max
3∑
t=1
βt−1E
[
U(Cjt (ω))| ω ∈ Ij1,i
]
s.t. Cjt (ω) =

ejt(ω) + pt(ω)X
j
t (ω) for t = 1, 2
ej3(ω) + p3(ω)X
j
3(ω) + d(ω)s
j
3(ω) for t = 3
Xjt (ω) is measurable w.r.t. P
j
t
Xjt (ω) ≤ sjt−1(ω)
sjt(ω) = s
j
t−1(ω)−Xjt (ω)
sj0 (ω) = nj ≥ 0, with nj independent of ω.
Here ω is a typical state of the world, j = E,F indicates Ellen and Frank, respectively,
Pjt is Agent j’s period-t (possibly price-refined) information partition for t = 1, 2, 3, e
j
t(ω)
is his/her endowment, sj0(ω) = nj is his/her initial endowment of the risky asset, s
j
t (ω) is
his/her risky-asset holdings at the end of period t, d(ω) is the risky asset’s state-ω dividend,
which is only paid in period 3, Xjt (ω) is his/her net sales of the risky asset, pt(ω) is the price
of the risky asset, and Cjt (ω) is Agent j’s period-t consumption. All of these are defined in
greater detail in the main paper.
We define M jt (ω) = pi(ω)β
t−1U ′
(
Cjt (ω)
)
to be the discounted shadow price of con-
sumption in period t, state ω. In other words, M jt (ω) is the ex ante expected marginal utility
that Agent j attaches to an additional unit of consumption in state ω in period t. Similarly,
M jt ({ω1, ..., ωk}) is the discounted shadow price of consumption in the collection of states
{ω1, ..., ωk}, so M jt ({ω1, ..., ωk}) = M jt (ω1) +M jt (ω2) + ...+M jt (ωk).
Note that these shadow prices depend on final consumption, and so, will depend
endogenously on the equilibrium outcome.
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Recall that Ellen’s and Frank’s information partitions are
Ellen: Period 1 : {{b, L}, {H}}
Period 2 : {{b}, {L}, {H}}
Frank: Period 1 : {{b}, {L,H}}
Period 2 : {{b}, {L,H}},
(2.1)
while the true state of the world is common knowledge to the agents by the beginning of
period 3. Agents’ endowments in period t are dependent on the state of the world ω, but
they must conform to their information partitions. For instance, Ellen’s period-1 endowment
in state b must equal her period-1 endowment in state L, so eE1 (b) = e
E
1 (L) = e
E
1 ({b, L}),
by slight abuse of notation. The risky asset only pays a dividend in state H, period 3, so
d(H) = d > 0 and d(b) = d(L) = 0.
In general, Agent j’s period-t first-order condition (FOC) from his/her expected util-
ity maximization problem, given his/her information set Ijt,i = {ω1, ..., ωk}, is
M jt (I
j
t,i)pt(ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ijt,i
M jt+1(ω)pt+1(ω). (2.2)
If Agent j is a buyer or a holder of the risky asset in period t, then (2.2) necessarily
holds as an equality. If (2.2) holds as a strict inequality, then Agent j must necessarily sell
any shares s/he owns, and in fact, must be short-sale constrained. We use this in the proof
of Proposition A.
Proposition A: Define p¯1 and p¯2 as solutions to
p¯2 =
pi(H)βU ′
(
eF3 (H) + (nE + nF )d
)
[pi(L) + pi(H)]U ′ (eF2 ({L,H})− (nE + nF )p¯2)
d =
MF3 (H)
MF2 ({L,H})
d (2.3)
and
p¯1 =
βU ′
(
eE2 (H) + (nE + nF )p¯2
)
U ′ (eE2 (H)− nF p¯1)
p¯2 =
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
p¯2. (2.4)
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Then in a three-state, three-period economy with the information structure described in
(2.1), there is a strong bubble equilibrium, such that
p1(ω) = p¯1 for all ω ∈ Ω, XF1 (ω) = −XE1 (ω) = nF for all ω ∈ Ω,
p2(b) = 0, X
E
2 (b) = X
F
2 (b) = 0,
p2(L) = p2(H) = p¯2, X
E
2 (ω) = −XF2 (ω) = nE + nF for ω = L,H,
p3(b) = p3(L) = 0, p3(H) = d, X
E
3 (ω) = X
F
3 (ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω,
if and only if the following three conditions are met.1
Condition 1 :
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
=
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
,
Condition 2 :
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
≥ M
F
2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
,
Condition 3 :
MF3 (H)
MF2 ({L,H})
≥ M
E
3 (H)
ME2 (H)
.
(2.5)
In the equilibrium, Condition 1 will imply that Ellen’s period-1 willingness-to-pay
(WTP) for the risky asset is the same in her cells {b, L} and {H}. Condition 2 will imply
that Ellen’s period-1 WTP in {H}, and so also in {b, L}, is greater than or equal to Frank’s
in {L,H}. Note also that Frank’s period-1 WTP is zero in state b since he knows the asset
price will be zero in the next period. Thus, Ellen’s WTP will be higher than Frank’s in state
b as well as in states L and H, and so in every state in period 1. As a result, Ellen will
buy and hold the risky asset in period 1, whatever the state is. Condition 3 will imply that
Frank’s period-2 WTP for the asset in {L,H} is greater than or equal to Ellen’s in {H}.
Thus, Ellen will sell the asset in state H in period 2. Ellen will also prefer to sell in state L,
since she knows the asset price will be zero in the next period. Thus, Ellen will sell and Frank
will buy the asset in both states L and H in period 2. In summary, if state b occurs, Ellen
will be the fool who buys a worthless asset in period 1. If state L occurs, Ellen will buy the
asset in period 1 and Frank, as a greater fool, will buy the asset back in period 2. Finally, if
1Recall that the shadow prices M jt (·) in (2.5) depend on the state-contingent consumption, and so, depend
on the prices given in (2.3) and (2.4).
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state H occurs, Ellen will buy the valuable asset to smooth her consumption between periods
1 and 2, and Frank will buy the asset back in period 2 to smooth his consumption between
periods 2 and 3. There is no fool in this last case.
Proof of Sufficiency : We first show that (2.5) gives sufficient conditions for Proposition
A’s prices and net sales to satisfy the FOCs and equilibrium conditions. The SOCs hold
automatically since markets are competitive and utility is concave.
Proof. Start with the last period, period 3. At this point, the true state of the world is
common knowledge to both Ellen and Frank. As a result, the period-3 asset price simply
equals its state-contingent dividend, so p3(b) = p3(L) = 0 and p3(H) = d. Also, neither
Ellen nor Frank has a motive to trade the asset, so XE3 (ω) = X
F
3 (ω) = 0 is optimal for all
ω ∈ Ω.
Next, consider period 2. In state b, it is common knowledge that the asset is worthless,
so the asset price equals zero, i.e., p2(b) = 0, and there is no motive to trade, so X
E
2 (b) =
XF2 (b) = 0 is optimal.
In states L and H, the risky asset’s worth is not common knowledge, so trades of the
risky asset may occur at a positive price. Assume Frank’s period-2 FOC in states L and H
holds as an equality. That is, Frank’s FOC, given that he holds shares in the risky asset, is
MF2 ({L,H})p2({L,H}) = MF3 (H)d, (2.6)
where by abuse of notation p2({L,H}) represents the common period-2 price in states L and
H. This, along with (2.3), implies that the period-2 equilibrium prices in states L and H
are p2(L) = p2(H) = p¯2.
Given the equilibrium price p¯2 and Condition 3, Ellen’s FOC in state H holds auto-
matically, since
p¯2 =
MF3 (H)
MF2 ({L,H})
d ≥ M
E
3 (H)
ME2 (H)
d.
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As a result, Condition 3 implies that Ellen’s period-2 FOC in state H given that she hold
zeros shares of the risky asset at the end of this period is
ME2 (H)p2(H) ≥ME3 (H)d, (2.7)
while her state-L analog holds automatically since she know the asset price will be zero next
period. Thus, in {L,H}, Frank bids the price up to p¯2, and Ellen is willing to sell all her
asset shares at this price in state H as well as in state L. Ellen’s and Frank’s period-2 net
sales of XE2 (ω) = −XF2 (ω) = sE1 (ω) are therefore optimal for ω = L,H. Also, assuming for
the moment that
sE1 (L) = s
E
1 (H), (2.8)
the quantity of shares traded does not differ across states L and H, so Frank cannot en-
dogenously refine his period-2 cell {L,H}. Thus, the period-2 equilibrium prices and net
sales are also optimal with respect to agents’ price-refined information sets, since there is no
actual price refinement.
Finally, consider period 1. Using (2.2), Ellen’s FOC in her cell {b, L} is
ME1 ({b, L})p1({b, L}) ≥ME2 (L)p¯2
, and Frank’s FOC in his cell {L,H} is
MF1 ({L,H})p1({L,H}) ≥MF1 ({L,H})p¯2. (2.9)
Again, in equilibrium, at least one of the agents’ FOCs must hold as an equality to
determine the equilibrium price. Condition 2 in (2.5) implies that Ellen’s period-1 WTP for
the asset in state H is greater than or equal to Frank’s WTP in {L,H}, while Condition 1
implies that Ellen’s period-1 WTP in her cell {b, L} is the same as her WTP in {H}. Thus,
Conditions 1 and 2 together imply that Ellen’s period-1 WTP is always greater than or equal
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to Frank’s WTP in states L and H. It is also greater than Frank’s WTP in state b, which
is zero, since Frank knows the asset price will fall to zero in the next period. As a result,
Ellen’s FOCs must hold as equalities. That is,
ME1 ({b, L})p1({b, L}) = ME2 (L)p¯2, (2.10)
and
ME1 (H)p1(H) = M
E
2 (H)p¯2. (2.11)
These two equalities, together with Condition 1, show the period-1 equilibrium prices are
equal, so p1(b) = p1(L) = p1(H). Equations (2.11) and (2.4) further show that p1(b) =
p1(L) = p1(H) = p¯1. Given the equilibrium price p¯1 and Condition 2, Frank’s period-1 FOC
in {L,H}, (2.9), holds automatically, since
p¯1 =
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
p¯2 ≥ M
F
1 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
p¯2.
Thus, at price p¯1, Frank sells all his asset shares in every state of the world. Ellen’s and
Frank’s period-1 net sales of −XE1 (ω) = XF1 (ω) = sF0 (ω) = nF are therefore optimal for all
ω ∈ Ω. Since neither the quantity of shares traded nor the asset price differs across the three
states, neither Ellen nor Frank can endogenously refine their period-1 information partitions,
and so the equilibrium prices and net sales obtained above are also optimal with respect to
agents’ price-refined information partitions. Finally, note that sE1 (L) = s
E
1 (H) = nE + nF ,
so the assumption in (2.8) is met.
A strong bubble occurs in state b, since p1(b) = p¯1 > 0, even though both Ellen and
Frank know, in that state, that the asset will never pay a dividend. The conditions in (2.5)
are therefore sufficient for the existence of a strong bubble in a three-state, three-period
economy with the information structure given in (2.1).
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Proof of necessity : We prove that a strong bubble equilibrium requires the three conditions
in (2.5).
Proof. Any strong bubble must occur in state b in the three-state, three-period economy,
because state b is the only state where everyone knows the asset will not pay a dividend.
Suppose then that the true state is b. In period 1, Frank knows for certain that the true state
is b, and he also knows the true state will become common knowledge in the next period,
so the asset price will fall to zero. Thus, Frank strictly prefers to sell all his asset shares
in state b in period 1 at any positive price. Frank therefore must also sell all his shares in
his cell {L,H}, since otherwise Ellen could distinguish state b from L and would not buy in
state b, which would unravel the bubble. Similarly, Ellen must also buy the same amount
of shares in state H as she does in state L, and at the same price, to ensure that Frank
cannot endogenously refine his cell {L,H}. Otherwise, in state b, it would become common
knowledge that the true state is b or L, not H. That is, it would become common knowledge
that the asset is worthless. As a result, Ellen would again not buy the asset in state b at
a positive price, which would again unravel the bubble. In her period-1 cell {b, L}, Ellen is
not sure of the true state, but she knows the period-2 asset price will crash to zero if the
state is b. Thus, Ellen is only willing to buy the overpriced asset in {b, L} in period 1 if she
expects to sell it in state L in period 2. Thus, Frank must be willing to buy the risky asset
in state L in period 2.
Moreover, Frank is only willing to buy the asset in state L if he thinks it might be
valuable, that is, only if he thinks the state might be H, where the asset will pay a dividend.
Thus, Ellen must also be willing to sell in state H in period 2.
Thus, in a strong bubble equilibrium, Ellen must buy the risky asset in period 1
in every state, at the same price, and Frank must buy the risky asset in states L and H
in period 2. Using (2.2), it follows that Frank’s FOC in his period-2 cell {L,H} must
hold as an equality, as in (2.6). This gives p2(L) = p2(H) = p¯2. At the price p¯2, Ellen’s
FOC in her period-2 cell {H}, i.e., (2.7), together with (2.6), implies Condition 3 in (2.5).
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Using (2.2) again, Ellen’s FOCs in her period-1 cells {b, L} and {H} must also hold as
equalities, since she buys in these states. Also, these two equalities must give the same
price. Since p2(L) = p2(H) = p¯2, these two equalities produce the same price only if
Condition 1 in (2.5) holds, as can be seen by comparing (2.10) and (2.11). The period-1
price is thus p1(b) = p1(L) = p1(H) = p¯1. Finally, given p1(L) = p1({L,H}), Frank’s FOC
in {L,H}, i.e., (2.9), together with (2.11), implies Condition 2 in (2.5). Therefore, the
three conditions in (2.5) are necessary for a strong bubble equilibrium in the three-state,
three-period economy.
Note that Condition 1 requires Ellen to have a period-1 consumption smoothing
motive to buy the asset that is stronger in state L than it is in state H. Specifically, this
consumption smoothing motive is sufficiently stronger in L that her WTP in {b, L} is the
same as her WTP in {H}, even though in {b, L} she is not sure whether the true state is
L, where she can resell the asset to Frank in period 2, or b, where she cannot. Condition
2 means that Ellen’s period-1 consumption smoothing motive, to buy the asset, in her cell
{H} is stronger than Frank’s period-1 consumption smoothing motive in his cell {L,H}.
Similarly, Condition 3 means that Frank has a stronger consumption smoothing motive to
buy the risky asset relative to Ellen in period 2 in state H, even though Frank is not sure
whether the true state is H, where the asset pays a dividend, or L, where it does not.
2.2.2 Numerical Example A
First, consider the numerical example in the main paper. We can check whether
the Conditions in Proposition A are met, which they should be since we already know that
a strong bubble equilibrium exists in this example. Condition 1 holds for the numerical
example in the main paper since
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
=
1
2
=
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
,
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and Condition 2 holds since
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
=
1
2
≥ 1
4
=
MF2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
.
Finally, Condition 3 holds since
MF3 (H)
MF2 ({L,H})
=
1
2
≥ 5
14
=
ME3 (H)
ME2 (H)
.
The asset prices for the strong bubble equilibrium in the main paper have simple, alge-
braic solutions because agents have logarithmic utility. For other utility functions, however,
the solutions for asset prices may be difficult to solve algebraically.
Table 2.1: Agents’ Endowments for Numerical Example A
State b L H
Period 1 82 82 18
Period 2 20 1 12
Period 3 400 400 400
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 4 4 4
Period 2 8 20 20
Period 3 20 20 8
Frank
In general, however, the asset prices in a strong bubble equilibrium, p1 and p2, are
relatively easy to solve recursively. We first find p2 using (2.3), which is one equation in one
unknown. Once we have a value for p2, we can find p1 using (2.4), which is also one equation
in one unknown, given p2. We can then use the values for p1 and p2 to find the state-and-time
dependent consumption values for Ellen and Frank and check whether Conditions 1, 2 and
3 hold, to ensure that these prices represent a strong bubble equilibrium.
Consider a numerical example similar to the one in Liu and White (2019), where
pi(ω) = 1
3
for ω ∈ Ω, β = 1, nE = nF = 1, and d = 4. However, in contrast to the main
paper’s numerical example, suppose that (i) both Ellen and Frank have a utility function
U(c) = 4
3
C
3
4 instead of logarithmic utility and (ii) agents’ endowments are those shown in
Table 2.1 rather than those in Tables 1 and 2 of Liu and White (2019)..
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In this numerical example, the analog of (2.3) is
p2 =
1
3
[8 + 2(4)]−
1
4
2
3
[20− 2p2]−
1
4
· 4 = (20− 2p2)
1
4 ,
which is difficult to solve algebraically. However, using Newton’s method, or any comparable
numerical algorithm, it becomes clear that the solution is p2 = 2. Next, using p2 = 2, the
analog of (2.4) is
p1 =
1
3
[12 + 2(2)]−
1
4
1
3
[18− p1]−
1
4
· 2 = (18− p1)
1
4 ,
which is also difficult to solve algebraically. However, again, using Netwon’s Method, for
example, we find p1 = 2.
Table 2.2: Agents’ Consumption for Numerical Example A
State b L H
Period 1 80 80 16
Period 2 20 5 16
Period 3 400 400 400
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 6 6 6
Period 2 8 16 16
Period 3 10 20 16
Frank
We then use p1 = 2 and p2 = 2 to calculate Ellen’s and Frank’s state-and-time
dependent consumption, as shown in Table 2.2 respectively. Using these consumption tables,
we can check to see if Conditions 1, 2, and 3 are met. If they are met, then we again have a
strong bubble equilibrium. Starting with Conditions 1, we can see that
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
=
1
2
· (5)
− 1
4
(80)−
1
4
= 1,
and
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
=
(16)−
1
4
(16)−
1
4
= 1.
This ensures that the period-1 asset prices across all states of the world are equal, so Ellen’s
information doesn’t leak to Frank, which therefore prevents an endogenous refining of Frank’s
61
period-1 cell {L,H}. Next, we see that Conditions 2 holds since
MF2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
=
(16)−
1
4
(6)−
1
4
=
(
3
8
) 1
4
,
which is less than the above value of
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
= 1. Finally, Condition 3 holds since
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
=
(400)−
1
4
(16)−
1
4
= 0.447,
which is less than
MF3 (H)
MF2 ({L,H})
=
1
3
(16)−
1
4
1
3
(16)−
1
4
= 0.5.
2.3 A Bubble in the Case of a Durable Good
In both Appendix A and the main paper, we assume that endowments of the con-
sumption good are completely perishable, and no riskless asset, e.g., money, exists. In those
examples, there are no means available, other than through trades of the bubble asset, for
agents to save portions of their endowment in order to intertemporally smooth their con-
sumption. In this appendix, we show that a strong bubble can still exist even if agents
have durable (i.e., storable) endowments. We do this by introducing a storage facility where
agents can privately store portions of their durable endowment. In general terms, this pri-
vate storage facility can be thought of as a bank that offers savings deposits. An agent
can discreetly “deposit” portions of his/her endowment into this storage facility, and other
agents are not able to observe the quantity of endowment placed into these storage facilities.
We begin this appendix by examining the utility-maximizing conditions that deter-
mine agents’ savings and storage decisions. We then show that the strong bubble equilibrium
in the main paper’s numerical example remains unchanged when we allow endowments to be
partially durable (i.e., partially perishable), because storage remains sufficiently unattrac-
tive. In general, a storage technology can be incorporated into any pre-existing three-state
model of a strong bubble without changing the equilibrium prices and asset trades, if the re-
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turn on storage is sufficiently low. This is because the storage technology can be specified to
have such unappealing intertemporal consumption smoothing benefits that agents never use
storage, and instead, decide to allocate all of their savings toward the bubble asset. Next, we
present a numerical example of a strong bubble where endowments are completely durable
(i.e., not perishable at all), and where storage is actually used in equilibrium. Specifically,
Ellen uses storage in period 1 in states b and L, and Frank uses storagein period 2 in states
L and H. Finally, we prove that, when storage technology is available, Ellen never uses
storage in state H (in either period 1 or 2) and Frank never uses storage in period 1 in his
cell {L,H}.
2.3.1 Utility-Maximizing Storage Conditions
Let δ ∈ [0, 1) be the consumption good’s one-period depreciation rate, so one unit
of consumption good placed in storage today will provide 1 − δ units of consumption after
one period. Thus, endowments are at least partially durable. Suppose, then, that in period
1, state ω, Agent j places vj1(ω) units of his/her period-1 endowment into storage. Agent
j will then have vj1(ω)(1 − δ) additional units of the consumption good at the beginning of
period 2. Note also that no one will use storage in period 3, so vj3(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω
and for j = E,F , because agents cannot consume after period 3. Thus, Agent j’s state-ω
consumption for periods 1, 2, and 3, respectively, are
Cj1(ω) = e
j
1(ω)− vj1(ω) + p1(ω)Xj1(ω)
Cj2(ω) = e
j
2(ω) + (1− δ)vj1(ω)− vj2(ω) + p2(ω)Xj2(ω)
Cj3(ω) = e
j
3(ω) + (1− δ)vj2(ω) + p3(ω)Xj3(ω) + d(ω)sj3 (ω) .
(2.12)
Agents are free to choose any nonnegative portion of their endowment to store, but
they cannot store a negative amount, i.e., they cannot borrow through the storage technology.
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Agent j chooses his/her level of storage, vjt (ω), according to the his/her FOC
M jt (I
j
t,i) ≥M jt+1(Ijt,i) (1− δ) , (2.13)
in each of his/her period-t information sets Ijt,i, and this holds as an equality if the agent
stores a positive amount of the consumption good. Thus, Agent j places none of his/her
endowment in storage, so vjt (ω) = 0, if (2.13) holds as a strict inequality, while v
j
t (ω) > 0
implies that (2.13) holds as an equality. This means Agent j’s storage decision is always
subject to the complementary slackness condition
vjt (ω) ·
[
M jt (I
j
t,i)−M jt+1(Ijt,i) (1− δ)
]
= 0. (2.14)
Alternatively, we can rewrite (2.13) as
1 ≥ M
j
t+1(I
j
t,i)
M jt (I
j
t,i)
· (1− δ) , (2.15)
where the right-hand side of (2.15) is Agent j’s period-t WTP in his/her cell Ijt,i, in terms
of the amount of period-t consumption he/she is willing to give up to receive 1− δ units of
consumption in period t+1. Again, Agent j places none of his/her endowment in storage, so
vjt (ω) = 0, if (2.15) is a strict inequality, while v
j
t (ω) > 0 only if (2.15) holds as an equality.
Intuitively, vjt (ω) = 0 if Agent j’s WTP for storage is less than the cost of storage, which is
always one unit of the consumption good, but if vjt (ω) > 0, then Agent j’s WTP for storage
is equal to the cost of storage.
The FOCs (2.7), (2.6), (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11) from Section 2.1 of course, continue
to apply, but the marginal utilities used to determine p1 and p2 are now evaluated at the
consumption levels in (2.12) instead of those from Section 2.2.
In addition, the three conditions in (2.5) are still necessary for an equilibrium, with
consumptions again calculated using (2.12), since the necessity part of Proposition A still
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applies. However, these conditions are no longer sufficient if storage is possible, though they
are sufficient for for p2 and p1, from (2.3) and (2.4), to satisfy the FOCs (2.7), (2.6), (2.9),
(2.10), and (2.11), with (2.12) used for consumption.
Finally, note that, because storage is always private, a storage decision by one agent
will not cause endogenous refinement of another agent’s information partitions. This means,
for instance, that Ellen can store different amounts of her period-1 endowment across her
cells {b, L} and {H}, without revealing to Frank whether the true states is L or H.
2.3.2 Numerical Example B1: Partially Durable Endowments
Consider the numerical example from Liu and White (2019). In this example, agents’
endowments are completely perishable, which means δ = 1. However, the strong bubble
equilibrium in this numerical example continues to exist even if we allow agents’ endowments
to be partially durable, or δ < 1, as long as δ is sufficiently close to one.
Table 2.3: Agents’ Willingness-to-Pay for Storage for Numerical Example B1
State b L H
Period 1 0.3 0.3 0.05
Period 2 0.1 0.5 0.036
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 0.021 0.025 0.025
Period 2 0.2 0.133 0.133
Frank
For example, suppose we allow δ = 0.9 so that 1− δ = 0.1. This slight adjustment in
our parameters does not unravel the strong bubble equilibrium in the main paper’s numerical
example. The asset prices continue to be p1 = 1 and p2 = 2, and the pattern of trade of the
risky-bubble asset remains XF1 (ω) = −XE1 (ω) = 1 ∀ ω ∈ Ω and XE2 (ω) = −XF2 (ω) = 2 for
ω = L,H. This is because the change in δ does not affect Ellen’s or Frank’s consumption,
since neither agent chooses to use storage to smooth his/her consumption intertemporally,
so vjt (ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, for t = 1, 2, 3 and for j = E,F . This becomes more apparent once
we use Ellen’s and Frank’s consumption values from Tables 5 and 6 in Liu and White (2019)
to calculate their respective state-and-time dependent WTPs for storage, which are shown
in Table 2.3. For each state and period, Ellen’s and Frank’s WTP for storage is less than the
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marginal cost of storage, which is one unit of the consumption good. As a result, vjt (ω) = 0
∀ ω ∈ Ω must be optimal for both Ellen and Frank in each period t in the main paper’s
example. If an agent’s WTP were greater than one, then zero storage would be suboptimal
since the agent could improve his/her expected utility by increasing storage until his/her
WTP falls to one.
2.3.3 Numerical Example B2: Perfectly Durable Endowments
We now show that a strong bubble equilibrium can exist even if agents’ endowments
are completely durable, so δ = 0. Like the numerical example in the main paper, we assume
nE = nF = 1, pi(ω) =
1
3
∀ ω ∈ Ω, U(C) = lnC, β = 1, d(b) = d(L) = 0, and d(H) = d = 4.
However, in contrast to the main paper’s numerical example, we assume that Ellen and
Frank have the state-and-time dependent endowments shown in Table 2.4. respectively.
Table 2.4: Agents’ Endowments for Numerical Example B2
State b L H
Period 1 17 17 7
Period 2 12 8 8
Period 3 15 30 30
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 7 6 6
Period 2 10 40 40
Period 3 10 16 8
Frank
As in previous strong bubble equilibria, Ellen buys Frank’s one share of the risky
asset in period 1 in states b, L, and H, and Frank buys Ellen’s two shares in period 2 in
states L and H. The period-1 equilibrium asset price is p1 = 1 ∀ ω ∈ Ω, and the period-2
equilibrium asset price is p2 = 2 for ω = L,H. Frank’s period-1 gross return from the risky
asset in his cell is riskless, at {L,H} is p2
p1
= 2, and Ellen’s period-2 gross return from the
risky asset in her cell {H} is riskless, at d
p1
= 2. Both of these returns are greater than the
gross return to storage of 1, so Frank doesn’t use storage in period 1 in his cell {L,H} and
Ellen doesn’t use storage in in period 2 in her cell {H}.
Ellen’s and Frank’s state-contingent storage for periods 1 and 2, or vj1(ω) and v
j
2(ω),
are shown in Table 2.5. Notice that, as we would expect, Ellen does not save through
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Table 2.5: Agents’ Storage for Numerical Example B2
State b L H
Period 1 2 2 0
Period 2 0 0 0
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 0 0 0
Period 2 0 10 10
Frank
storage in state H in period 2 while Frank does not save through storage in period 1 in his
cell {L,H}. However, Ellen does store 2 units of her period-1 endowment in her cell {b, L}
while Frank stores 10 units of his period-2 endowment in his cell {L,H}.
Table 2.6: Agents’ Consumption for Numerical Example B2
State b L H
Period 1 14 14 6
Period 2 14 14 12
Period 3 15 30 30
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 8 7 7
Period 2 10 26 26
Period 3 10 26 26
Frank
Ellen’s and Frank’s state-and-time dependent consumption are shown in Table 2.6.
Using these consumption values, we can check Conditions 1, 2, and 3 to make sure that the
FOCs (2.7), (2.6), (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11) still hold with, p2 and p1 from (2.3) and (2.4).
Condition 1 holds since
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
=
1/12
1/6
=
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
=
(1/14)
(1/14) + (1/14)
=
1
2
,
and Condition 2 holds since
MF2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
=
(1/26) + (1/26)
(1/7) + (1/7)
=
7
26
≤ 1
2
.
Additionally, Condition 3 holds since
ME3 (H)
ME2 (H)
=
1/30
1/12
=
12
30
≤ M
F
3 (H)
MF2 ({L,H})
=
(1/26)
(1/26) + (1/26)
=
1
2
.
Thus, a strong bubble is present even though the consumption good is completely durable.
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We use (2.3) and (2.4) to confirm that p1 = 1 and p2 = 2 are indeed the equilibrium
asset price values. Beginning with period 2, its clear that p2 = 2 is the equilibrium asset
price for period 2, since
p2 =
MF3 (H)
MF3 ({L,H})
· d = 1
2
· 4 = 2.
Furthermore, p1 = 1 is the correct equilibrium asset price for period 1, since
p1 =
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
· p2 =
1
2
· 2 = 1.
Of course, the FOCs (2.7), (2.6), (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11) can also be checked directly.
Table 2.7: Agents’ Willingness-to-Pay for Storage for Numerical Example B2
State b L H
Period 1 1 1 0.5
Period 2 0.93 0.47 0.4
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 0.8 0.27 0.27
Period 2 1 1 1
Frank
Finally, we can check agents’ storage FOCs by calculating their respective state-and-
time dependent WTPs for storage. Ellen’s and Frank’s WTPs for storage are calculated in
Table 2.7. Notice that, when an agent stores a positive quantity of the consumption good,
his/her WTP is always 1. In period 1, Ellen places 2 units of her endowment into storage
in states b and L, so her WTP is 1 as shown in the top row of the left panel of Table 2.6.
In period 2, Frank places 10 units of his endowment into storage in states L and H, so his
WTP is 1 as shown in the bottom row of the right panel of Table 2.6. Furthermore, notice
that agents do not use storage when their WTP is less than 1. For instance, Frank does not
use storage in period 1 in any state of the world because his WTP is always less than 1. The
same is true for Ellen in period 1, state H as well as in period 2, states b and L. However,
notice that Frank’s WTP is 1 in period 2 in state b even though he does not use storage.
This is because a storage WTP equal to 1 is a necessary condition for positive storage but it
is not a sufficient condition. Conversely, a storage WTP less than 1 is a sufficient condition
for zero storage, but it is not a necessary condition.
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2.3.4 Agents’ General Storage Decisions
We now examine agents’ storage decisions in the general context of any strong bubble
equilibrium, given our three-state, three-period structure, and show that, in states where
risky-bubble asset has a riskless positive payoff next period, the gross return to the risky-
bubble asset exceeds the gross return to storage. This result allows us to determine the
state and period where an agent never uses the storage technology. Proposition B1 examines
Ellen’s period-1 storage decision in state H.
Proposition B1: In any strong bubble equilibrium where storage technology
is available, the gross return to the risky asset is always greater than the gross return to
storage in period 1 in states L and H, so p2
p1
> 1− δ. Furthermore, Ellen never uses storage
in period 1 in state H, so vE1 (H) = 0.
Proof. Compare the reciprocal of Condition 1 with the reciprocal of Ellen’s period-1, state-H
analog of (2.15). This gives
1− δ ≤ M
E
1 ({b, L})
ME2 ({b, L})
<
ME1 ({b, L})
ME2 (L)
=
ME1 (H)
ME2 (H)
=
p2
p1
(2.16)
so p2
p1
> 1 − δ. In period 1 in state H, Ellen knows with certainty that p2
p1
> 1 − δ, so she
devotes all of her savings to the risky-bubble asset to maximize the value of her savings next
period. This means that none of her savings are allocated to storage, so vE1 (H) = 0.
Note that (2.16) implies ME1 (H) > M
E
2 (H)(1−δ), so by the complementary slackness
condition in (2.14), Ellen’s period-1 storage in state H must be vE1 (H) = 0.
Intuitively, in her period-1 cell {b, L}, Ellen can use the risky-bubble asset to in-
tetermporally smooth her consumption in state L but not in state b. In contrast, the storage
technology allows Ellen to intertemporally smooth her consumption in both states b and L.
Thus, Ellen requires a larger state-L return on the risky-bubble asset than on storage to
compensate her for the loss on the risky asset in state b. Since the return to risky asset is
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the same across states L and H, the state-H return on the risky asset must also be greater
than the return to storage.
Next, consider Frank’s period-1 storage decision in his cell {L,H}. We examine this
in Proposition B2.
Proposition B2: In any strong bubble equilibrium where storage technology
is available, Frank will never use storage in period 1 in states L and H, so vF1 ({L,H}) = 0.
Proof. In period 1 in his cell {L,H}, Frank knows with certainty that p2
p1
> 1 − δ, so he
devotes all of his savings to the risky-bubble asset to maximize the value of his savings next
period. This means that none of his savings are allocated to storage, so vF1 ({L,H} = 0.
Note that combining the inequality p2
p1
> 1 − δ with the reciprocal of Condition 2
gives
1− δ < M
E
1 (H)
ME2 (H)
≤ M
F
1 ({L,H})
MF2 ({L,H})
.
This implies MF1 ({L,H}) > MF2 ({L,H}) (1− δ), so vF1 ({L,H}) = 0 by the complementary
slackness condition.
Intuitively, Frank has a relatively large liquidity demand in period 1 in his cell {L,H},
so he is not willing to save to earn a relatively large gross return of p2/p1. Since he is
unwillilling to save to earn a larger gross return of p2/p1, he must therefore also be unwilling
to store to earn a smaller gross return of 1− δ.
Finally, in Proposition B3, we examine Ellen’s period-2 storage decision in state H.
Proposition B3: In any strong bubble equilibrium where storage technology
is available, the gross return to the risky asset is always greater than the gross return to
storage in period 2 in state H, so d
p2
> 1−δ. Furthermore, Ellen never uses storage in period
2, state H, so vE2 (H) = 0.
Proof. First, recall that Frank’s period-2 storage decision in his cell {L,H} is made accord-
ing to his FOC in (2.6), i.e., MF2 ({L,H}) ≥ MF3 ({L,H}) (1− δ). Combing this with the
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reciprocal of Condition 3 implies
1− δ ≤ M
F
2 ({L,H})
MF3 ({L,H})
<
MF2 ({L,H})
MF3 (H)
=
d
p2
, (2.17)
so d
p2
> 1− δ. Because Ellen knows d
p2
> 1− δ with certainty, she devotes all of her savings
to the risky asset in order to maximize the value of her savings next period. As a result, she
allocates none of her savings to storage, so vE2 (H) = 0.
Intuitively, between periods 2 and 3, the risky-bubble asset allows Frank to smooth his
intertemporal consumption in state H but not in state L. However, the storage technology
allows Frank to smooth his intertemporal consumption in both states L and H. Thus, in state
H, Frank requires a larger return on the risky-bubble asset than on the storage technology.
Ellen knows the true state is H, so she knows for sure that her savings from the risky-asset
would receive a gross return of p3(H)
p2(H)
= d
p2
> 1 − δ. Since Ellen is unwilling to save to earn
a relatively large gross return of d/p2, she must also be unwilling to store to earn a smaller
gross return of 1− δ.
2.4 A Risky-Bubble Asset with a Risk-Free Asset
We now examine strong bubble equilibria when risk-free assets are available. We
assume that each agent j is endowed with njf (t) shares of the risk-free asset at the beginning
of period t, so nTf (t) = n
E
f (t) + n
F
f (t) is the total number of shares of the risk-free asset at
the beginning of period t. With a probability of one, each share of the risk-free asset pays a
dividend of one unit of the consumption good at some point in the future, depending on the
risk-free asset’s maturity structure. Each risk-free asset can mature in either one period or
two periods. A risk-free asset purchased in period t that matures after one period will pay
a dividend in period t + 1, while one that matures after two periods will pay a dividend in
period t+ 2. Since our strong bubble model has three periods, agents can have two separate
endowments of the risk-free asset if it has a one-period maturity: one endowment received
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at the beginning of period 1 and another endowment received at the beginning of period
2. However, for shares of a risk-free asset that mature after two periods, agents can only
receive their endowments at the beginning of period 1.2 As a result, if the risk-free asset
has a two-period maturity, then agents never receive a period-2 endowment of shares of the
risk-free asset, so njf (2) = 0.
2.4.1 Risk-Free Asset with a One-Period Maturity
Consider a risk-free asset that matures after one period. Let qt(ω) be the period-t
price of a share of the risk-free in state ω, and let Y jt (ω) be agent j’s net sales of the risk-
free asset over the course of period t. At the beginning of period t, Agent j receives an
endowment of njf (t) shares of the risk-free asset for t = 1, 2. Finally, let z
j
t (ω) be the number
of shares of the risk-free asset that agent j has held to maturity by the beginning of period
t+ 1. Thus, if the risk-free asset has a maturity of one period, then Agent j’s state-and-time
dependent consumption is
Cj1(ω) = e
j
1(ω) + q1(ω)Y
j
1 (ω) + z
j
0(ω) + p1(ω)X
j
1(ω)
Cj2(ω) = e
j
2(ω) + q2(ω)Y
j
2 (ω) + z
j
1(ω) + p2(ω)X
j
2(ω)
Cj3(ω) = e
j
3(ω) + q3(ω)Y
j
3 (ω) + z
j
2(ω) + p3(ω)X
j
3(ω) + d(ω)s
j
3(ω)
(2.18)
where sjt(ω) = s
j
t−1(ω)−Xjt (ω) and zjt (ω) = njf (t)− Y jt (ω). As in section 2.2, the true state
of the world is common knowledge by the beginning of period 3, and consumption ceases
after the end of period 3. As a result, every period-3 asset price equals the its period-3
divided, so q3(ω) = 1 and p3(ω) = d(ω), and all trading stops by the beginning of period
3, so Y j3 (ω) = X
j
3(ω) = 0. Finally, note that Agent j has not held any risk-free assets to
maturity by the beginning of period 1, so zj0(ω) = 0.
2For ease of exposition, we will not consider instances where risk-free assets of different maturities are
traded simultaneously. If agents are endowed with shares in a risk-free asset with a one-period maturity,
then they will never be endowed with shares in a risk-free asset with a two-period maturity, and vice versa.
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In general, agents choose their net sales of the risk-free asset in order to maximize
their expected lifetime utility. Agent j’s FOC in his/her period-t cell {ω1 . . . ωk} is
M jt ({ω1 . . . ωk})qt(ω) ≥M jt+1({ω1 . . . ωk}). (2.19)
Notice from (2.19) that the price of the risk-free asset in period t + 1 is simply one unit of
the consumption good, since the risk-free asset matures after one period. Thus, Agent j’s
period-t WTP for one share of the risk-free asset in his//her cell {ω1 . . . ωk} is
M jt+1({ω1 . . . ωk})
M jt ({ω1 . . . ωk})
.
If Agent j buys and holds the risk-free asset in period t in state ω, then (2.19) is necessarily an
equality, and Agent j’s WTP for the risk-free asset determines the risk-free asset’s equilibrium
price. If (2.19) is a strict inequality, then Agent j is necessarily a seller of the risk-free asset
who is short-sale constrained.
Of course, the FOCs (2.7), (2.6), (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11) from section 2.2 continue
to apply. However, the marginal utilities used to determine p1 and p2 are evaluated at the
consumption levels in (2.18) instead of those from Section 2.2
2.4.1.1 A Risk-Free Asset in Period 2
A strong bubble equilibrium is possible when agents are endowed in period 2 with a
risk-free asset that matures after one period. Ellen’s period-2 WTP for the risk-free asset in
state H is
ME3 (H)
ME2 (H)
,
while Frank’s period-2 WTP in {L,H} is
MF3 ({L,H})
MF2 ({L,H})
.
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Condition 3 in Section 2.2 implies
MF3 ({L,H})
MF2 ({L,H})
>
ME3 (H)
ME2 (H)
,
which means that Frank’s period-2 intertemporal consumption smoothing motive in his cell
{L,H} is always greater than Ellen’s period-2 motive in her cell {H}. In other words, Frank
has a higher WTP for the risk-free asset in a strong bubble equilibrium in period 2, state
H. As a result, Frank will purchase all of Ellen’s shares in the risk-free asset in period 2 in
state H, assuming that Ellen’s period-2 WTP for the risk-free asset in L is also lower than
Frank’s period-2 WTP in his cell {L,H}. Thus, the equilibrium pattern of trade for the
risk-free asset is Y E2 (ω) = n
E
f (2) for ω = L,H and Y
F
2 (ω) = −nEf (2). Thus, the period-2
equilibrium risk-free asset price in states L and H, q2 = q2(L) = q2(H), is
q2 =
MF3 ({L,H})
MF2 ({L,H})
.
2.4.1.2 Numerical Example C
To see how a risk-free asset endowed in period 2 can exist within a strong bubble
equilibrium, consider a numerical example where Ellen is endowed with nEf (2) = n
T
f (2) = 8
shares of a risk-free asset in period 2, while Frank never receives any endowment of risk-free
asset shares, so nFf (2) = 0. Furthermore, assume that Ellen and Frank have the endowment
structures shown in Table 2.8. Also, assume that pi(ω), β, U(C), nEf (2), n
F
f (2), and the
dividend structure of the risky asset is the same as those in the numerical examples in Liu
and White (2019) and Sections 2.2 and 2.3
Table 2.8: Agents’ Endowments for Numerical Example C
State b L H
Period 1 17 17 9
Period 2 4 4 4
Period 3 64 64 64
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 10 9 9
Period 2 36 40 40
Period 3 20 20 12
Frank
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In equilibrium, Frank sells his 1 share of the risky asset to Ellen in period 1 in each
state of the world, and Ellen sells her 2 shares to Frank in period 2 in states L and H.
Since neither Ellen nor Frank is endowed with shares of the risk-free asset in period 1,
the equilibrium trades of the risk-free asset is zero in period 1. However, in the period-2
equilibrium, Ellen sells all 8 of her shares of the risk-free asset to Frank in states b, L and H.3
The equilibrium period-1 risky asset is price p1 = 1 ∀ ω ∈ Ω, and the equilibrium period-2
risky asset price is p2 = 2 for ω = {L,H}. Furthermore, the equilibrium period-2 risk-free
asset price is q2 = q2(b) = q2(L) = q2(H) = 1. Ellen’s and Frank’s resulting consumption
are shown in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: Agents’ Consumption for Numerical Example C
State b L H
Period 1 16 16 8
Period 2 12 16 16
Period 3 64 64 64
Ellen
State b L H
Period 1 11 10 10
Period 2 28 28 28
Period 3 28 28 28
Frank
As in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we can use the consumption values in Table 2.9 to make
sure the Conditions in (2.5) are not violated, starting with Condition 1 which does indeed
hold since
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
=
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
=
1
2
.
Furthermore, we know that Condition 2 holds since
MF2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
=
5
14
≤ 1
2
.
Finally, Condition 3 holds because
MF3 (H)
MF2 ({L,H})
=
1
2
≥ M
E
3 (H)
ME2 (H)
=
1
4
.
3Note, a strong bubble equilibrium requires the period-2 risk-free asset prices in states L and H to be
equal. However, a strong bubble equilibrium does not require the period-2 risk-free asset price in state b to
equal the period-2 price in states L and H, though it does in this example.
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2.4.1.3 A Risk-Free Asset in Period 1
We now show that a strong bubble equilibrium cannot exist if a risk-free asset with
a one-period maturity is held/traded in period 1. This is shown in the proof of Proposition
C1.
Proposition C1: In a three-state model, a strong bubble equilibrium cannot
exist if agents can hold a risk-free asset with a one-period maturity in period 1.
Proof. Assume that a strong bubble equilibrium exists, and a risk-free asset with a one-
period maturity is available in period 1. Suppose Ellen buys and holds the risk-free asset
in period 1, so it is her WTP that determines the risk-free asset’ period-1 price in a strong
bubble equilibrium. Ellen’s WTP for the risk-free asset in H is
q1(H) =
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
while her WTP for the risk-free asset in b and L is
q1({b, L}) = M
E
2 ({b, L})
ME1 ({b, L})
.
If this is a strong bubble equilibrium, then it must be that q1(H) = q1({b, L}) otherwise
Frank’s period-1 cell {L,H} will be endogenously refined. This implies
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
=
ME2 ({b, L})
ME1 ({b, L})
>
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
which violates Condition 1. Thus, it cannot be Ellen’s WTP that determines the period-1
price of the risk-free asset in a strong bubble equilibrium.
Now suppose Frank buys and holds the risk-free asset in period 1, so it is his WTP
that determines the risk-free asset’s period-1 price in a strong bubble equilibrium. This must
mean that Frank’s WTP for the risk-free asset is greater than Ellen’s WTP in any state of
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the world ω, so
MF2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
≥ M
E
2 ({b, L})
ME1 ({b, L})
.
However, this means that Condition 1 and Condition 2 are mutually exclusive, because if
Condition 1 holds then it must be that
MF2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
>
ME2 (L)
ME1 ({b, L})
=
ME2 (H)
ME1 (H)
,
which contradicts Condition 2. Thus, it cannot be Frank’s WTP that determines the period-1
price of the risk-free asset in a strong bubble equilibrium.
Since neither buys and holds the risk-free asset, neither agent’s WTP can determine
the period-1 price of the risk-free asset in a strong bubble equilibrium. This implies that a
strong bubble equilibrium cannot exist if a risk-free asset with a one-period maturity can be
held in period 1.
2.4.2 A Risk-Free Asset with a Two-Period Maturity
Now consider a risk-free asset that matures after two periods. As in the case of a
risk-free asset with a one-period maturity, let qt(ω) be the period-t price of one share of the
risk-free asset in state ω, and let Y jt (ω) be Agent j’s period-t net sales of the risk-free asset
in state ω. At the beginning of period 1, Agent j receives an endowment of njf shares of
the risk-free asset. Unlike the case of a risk-free asset with one-period maturity, Agent j
only receives one endowment of the risk-free asset when the risk-free asset has a two-period
maturity. Finally, let zjt (ω) be the quantity of risk-free asset shares that Agent j owns by
the end of period t. Thus, if the risk-free asset has a two-period maturity, then Agent j’s
consumption is
77
Cj1(ω) = e
j
1(ω) + q1(ω)Y
j
1 (ω) + p1(ω)X
j
1(ω)
Cj2(ω) = e
j
2(ω) + q2(ω)Y
j
2 (ω) + p2(ω)X
j
2(ω)
Cj3(ω) = e
j
3(ω) + q3(ω)Y
j
3 (ω) + z
j
3(ω) + p3(ω)X
j
3(ω) + d(ω)s
j
3(ω)
(2.20)
where sjt(ω) = s
j
t−1(ω)−Xjt (ω) and zjt (ω) = zjt−1(ω)−Y jt (ω). As in the previous subsection,
q3(ω) = 1 and p3(ω) = d(ω), and Y
j
3 (ω) = X
j
3(ω) = 0.
In general, agents choose their expected net sales of the risk-free asset to maximize
their expected lifetime utility. In his/her period-t cell Ijt,i = {ω1 . . . ωk}, Agent j’s FOC is
M jt (I
j
t,i)qt(ω) ≥
∑
ω∈Ijt,i
M jt+1(ω)qt+1(ω), (2.21)
so his/her WTP for the risk-free asset is
∑
ω∈Ijt,iM
j
t+1(ω)qt+1
M jt (I
j
t,i)
.
Note that q3(ω) = 1. Thus, in period 2 (2.21) is simply
M jt (I
j
t,i)q2(ω) ≥M jt+1({ω1 . . . ωk}).
If Agent j is the buyer of the risk-free asset in period t in state ω, then (2.21) is necessarily an
equality, and Agent j’s WTP for the risk-free asset determines the risk-free asset’s equilibrium
price. If (2.21) is a strict inequality, then Agent j is necessarily a seller of the risk-free asset
who is short-sale constrained.
Of course, the FOCs (2.7), (2.6), (2.9), (2.10), and (2.11) from Appendix A continue
to apply. However, the marginal utilities used to determine p1 and p2 are evaluated at the
consumption levels in (2.20) instead of those from Appendix A.
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2.4.2.1 A Risk-Free Asset in Period 1
Proposition C2: In a three-state model, a strong bubble equilibrium cannot
exist if agents can hold a risk-free asset with a two-period maturity in period 1.
Proof. Assume that a strong bubble equilibrium exists, and a risk-free asset with a two-
period maturity is available in period 1. Condition 3 requires that Frank have a larger
period-2 WTP for the risk-free asset than Ellen in state H. This must also be true for state
L, otherwise Frank’s period-2 cell would be endogenously refined. Thus, in a strong bubble
equilibrium, Frank’s period-2 WTP for the risk-free asset must determine the period-2 price
of the risk-free asset in states L and H, so
q2({L,H} = M
F
2 ({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
,
and q2(b) is the period-2 price of the risk-free asset in state b.
Buying a risk-free asset with two periods left till maturity in period 1 and then selling
it in period 2 is equivalent to buying a risk-free asset with a one-period maturity in period 1
that pays an period-2 dividend of q2({L,H}) in states L and H and q2(b) in state b. Suppose
Ellen buys and holds this risk-free asset in period 1, so it is her WTP that determines its
period-1 price. Ellen’s period-1 WTP for the risk-free asset in her cell {b, L} is
ME2 (b)q2(b) +M
E
2 (L)q2({L,H})
ME1 ({b, L})
, (2.22)
and her period-1 WTP in her cell {H} is
ME2 (H)q2({L,H})
ME1 (H)
. (2.23)
In a strong bubble equilibrium, Ellen’s WTPs in (2.22) and (2.23) must be equal, otherwise
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Frank could refine his cell {L,H}. . However, this violates Condition 1 since
ME2 (H)q2({L,H})
ME1 (H)
=
ME2 (b)q2(b) +M
E
2 (L)q2({L,H})
ME1 ({b, L})
>
ME2 (L)q2({L,H})
ME1 ({b, L})
,
so Ellen cannot buy and hold the risk-free asset in period 1 in a strong bubble equilibrium.
Now suppose Frank buys and holds the risk-free asset in period 1. Frank’s WTP for the
risk-free asset in his cell {L,H} determines the period-1 price of the risk-free asset. This
means his period-1 WTP must be greater than or equal to Ellen’s period-1 WTP in any
state of the world ω, so
MF2 ({L,H})q2({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
≥ M
E
2 (b)q2(b) +M
E
2 (L)q2({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
.
However, this implies that Conditions 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive because if if Condition
1 is met, then
MF2 ({L,H})q2({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
>
ME2 (L)q2({L,H})
MF1 ({L,H})
=
ME2 (H)q2({L,H})
ME1 (H)
,
which violates Condition 2. Thus, Frank cannot buy and hold the risk-free asset in period
1 in a strong bubble equilibrium. Since, neither agent can buy and hold the risk-free asset
in period 1 in a strong bubble equilibrium, then a strong bubble cannot exist if a risk-free
asset with a two-period maturity can be held in period 1.
2.4.3 Summary
In summary, a strong bubble is not possible in a three-state model when a one-period
risk-free asset is available for sale in period, though Conlon et al. (2019) show that it is
possible in a four-state model. However, a strong bubble is possible in a three-state model
if the risk-free asset is introduced in period 2. The former result provides implications for
the introduction of new asset markets as an information transmission mechanism. Because
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intertemporal consumption smoothing incentives vary across states of the world, risk-free
asset prices may also differ across states of the world since risk-free asset prices reflect agents’
intertemporal consumption smoothing motives. This means that, in the three-state model,
the introduction of new asset markets can reveal agents’ private information about the true
state of the economy, thereby preventing the formation of asset price bubbles. However, this
lesson may not be robust in a four-state model.
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